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ABSTRACT 
 
AN ANALYSIS ON THE 
CONTRIBUTION OF CIVIL SOCIETY TO DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION  
IN TURKEY  
 
Torus, Emre 
Department of Political Science and Public Administration 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ergun Özbudun 
 
May 2007 
 
 
This is an analysis on the contribution of civil society to democratic 
consolidation in Turkey. This thesis will try to understand this problematic by 
assessing the civil society’s formal structure, legal framework, internal values 
and its impact during the consolidation process. The key aim here is to 
understand the civil society’s role as a contributor to democratic consolidation 
by mapping the civil society and democratic consolidation relationship in 
Turkey. While doing so, this study will base itself on a combination of theories 
that link the civil society to democratic consolidation with an empirical tool for 
the assessment of this linkage.  
 
Keywords: Civil society, democratic consolidation, Turkey. 
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ÖZET 
 
TÜRKİYE’DEKİ SİVİL TOPLUMUN DEMOKRATİK PEKİŞMEYE ETKİSİ 
ÜZERİNE BİR İNCELEME 
Torus, Emre 
Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Ergun Özbudun 
 
Mayıs 2007 
 
Bu çalışma Türkiye’deki sivil toplumun demokratik pekişme ile olan ilişkisini 
incelemektedir. Çalışma, bahsedilen ilişkiyi Türkiye’deki demokratik pekişme 
süreci içerisinde sivil toplumun resmi yapısını, faaliyet gösterdiği yasal 
çerçevesini, içsel değerlerini ve etkisini inceleyerek açımlamaya çalışmaktadır.  
Bu çalışma ile hedeflenen, sivil toplumun ile demokratik pekişme arasındaki 
ilişkinin ortaya konması ve bu ilişkinin izlerinin Türkiye özelinde sürülmesidir. 
Çalışma, sivil toplum ve demokratik pekişme ilişkisini ele alan bir dizi teoriyi, 
yenilikçi bir ampirik uygulma ile birleştirerek adı geçen ilişkiyi incelemeye 
çalışmıştır.  
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Sivil toplum, demokratik pekişme, Türkiye. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This is an analysis on the contribution of civil society to democratic 
consolidation in Turkey. This thesis will try to understand this problematic by 
assessing the civil society‘s formal structure, legal framework, internal values 
and its impact during the consolidation process. The key aim here is to 
understand the civil society‘s role as a contributor to democratic consolidation 
by mapping the civil society and democratic consolidation relationship in 
Turkey. While doing so, this study will base itself on a combination of theories 
that link the civil society to democratic consolidation with an empirical tool for 
the assessment of this linkage.  
 
 As controversial areas, there are a number of different conceptual 
approaches to democratic consolidation, civil society and their relationship. As 
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the core concepts of this thesis, these concepts will be employed in a 
particular framework throughout the study. The following paragraphs will offer 
a brief explanation about this framework and the detailed theoretical 
discussion about these concepts will be provided in the following chapters.  
 
 For the purposes of this thesis, the term democratic consolidation shall 
be understood as ―the process of attaining broad and deep legitimation about 
the democratic regime‖ (Diamond, 1999: 65). Three key areas appear as 
important for this definition. First democratic consolidation is a process. 
Second, within this process, the political actors of democratic regime (both at 
elite and mass levels) craft its characteristics. Third, it is expected that elites 
and masses should demonstrate a broad consent on the legitimacy of the 
constitutional system rather than promoting the authoritarian solutions (Linz 
and Stepan, 1996: 3-7; O‘Donnell, 1992: 49; Gunther, Puhle and 
Diamandouros, 1995: 8-10). As Diamond puts it (1999: 65) in total this process 
refers to a shift in political culture and this shift isdominated by a number of 
actors within the society.  
  
 Although both the elites and masses appear as the main actors of 
democratic consolidation process, a considerable amount of work on 
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democratic consolidation has a special focus on actions, setups and culture of 
political elites as the main directing agents of democratic consolidation. 
Established preference within this literature is to define democratic 
consolidation as an end product of a consensus among ruling elites on the 
rules of the democratic system (Burton, Gunther and Higley, 1992; O‘Donnell, 
Schmitter and Whitehead, 1986; Przeworski, 1992). Without any doubt, 
political elites can be counted among the key actors within the consolidation 
period. In most of the cases their impact goes well beyond the above 
mentioned consensus and elites act as the main agents of the democratic 
regime. They direct and decide on regime type (i.e. whether it is parliamentary 
or presidential), on concentration of power and on settings of institutions of 
accountability (i.e. constitutional court). Moreover, elites‘ legacy is influential 
on how party and interest group leaders exercise their power. These include 
their ability to bargain with each other, form coalitions, mobilize public support, 
and respond to public demands (Diamond, 1999: 219). 
 
As the last sentence of previous paragraph suggests, although elites 
may be pre-eminent, they do not constitute the whole framework. The actors 
that take part during the process of democratic consolidation are not only the 
individuals either at elite or mass level. A number of institutions that aim to 
organize the collective action such as political parties, trade unions, 
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professional associations and alike are also quite influential in this process. 
These actors have their own action strategies and normative orientations. 
These orientations, characteristics, rhetoric and strategies can be counted 
among the important determinants in sketching democracy. Furthermore, 
democracy cannot be defined solely as a system where elites compete and 
acquire power though elections. Democratic regimes must be responsive and 
responsible to the interests of the public and to that end, democratic political 
systems should function in a setting of rule of law that protects the rights to 
speak, publish, organize, lobby and demonstrate for their citizens. The 
importance of mass public for democratic consolidation rests on this 
assumption: The mass public, through organizing itself, always has the chance 
to improve upon the democratic regimes by questioning and challenging the 
present undemocratic practices and values. Mass public, through their 
organizations, can play a part in democratic consolidation by contributing to 
the social and political programs by trying to bring to the public agenda the 
topics that are salient to them. Through vocalizing the problems and needs, 
civil society organizations can produce warnings for the elected officials and 
pinpoint the problems related to democratic shortages. On the occasions when 
the governing elites do not take action for solving problems related to the 
democratic deficits, civil society appears to be the only tool for identifying 
these problems. These organizations by intercommunicating through mass 
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medium or by directly drawing attention of the elected officials by utilizing 
different tools like campaigns may elevate and pinpoint the issues of 
democracy into the political agenda. On the areas like public administration 
reforms or human rights issues that elites seem reluctant to act upon, civil 
society may fill the gap and put up the issues in the public circles. All these 
examples refer to the fact that democracy as a political system necessitates a 
public that is organized for democracy, digest its values and norms and 
committed to its common ―civic‖ ends (Diamond, 1999: 221). A possible way to 
construct this public is through civil society. 
 
The Case 
 This study will try to locate the above-mentioned discussion in the 
Turkish context. By such an effort, I hope to underscore the following. The 
above mentioned elite-centred approach is also visible in the literature on 
Turkey. Throughout the literature on both civil society and democratic 
consolidation in Turkey, the significant reference has generally been made to 
the behaviour, organization and the culture of political and/or state elites 
(Heper, 1992; Heper and Keyman, 1998; Heper and Güney, 2000; Özbudun, 
1996; Özbudun, 1997). It is persuasively argued that there is an ―omnipotent 
state‖, which shapes both society and political system within the Ottoman-
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Turkish continuum. Undoubtedly, this type of strong and coercive state, 
supported by strong bureaucratic tradition, was permanently sceptical of civil 
society. Additionally the dominance of community over individual and 
uniformity over diversity, donates the state with a pre-approved responsibility 
of leading the ignorant masses located at the periphery (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002: 
250). Hence, it would not be wrong to argue that the state in Ottoman-Turkish 
continuum tried to pressurize, oppress or curb the civil society and in most of 
the cases did not allow the formation of societal consensus that might emerge 
from bottom during the Ottoman-Turkish continuum. Accordingly, one does not 
anticipate much to find a civil society in Turkey that is contributive to 
democratic consolidation.  
 
 However, such explanations of civil society that profoundly rooted in 
history and culture, although comprehensive and highly illuminating, does not 
―necessarily do justice to the potential for change in the political system or 
indeed within society itself‖ (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002: 250). In Turkey civil society 
movements have been growing since 1980s and especially during the 1990s 
in terms of qualitative and quantitative importance for making Turkish society 
more liberal and democratic than before (Keyman and İçduygu, 2003: 217-
232). Especially during the 1990s civil society‘s role as a contributor to 
democratic consolidation appeared in the agenda of among both decision 
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makers and academia with the special focus of European Union candidacy. It 
is correctly argued that civil society in Turkey, for the first time in Turkish 
politics started to articulate and represent the demands of various social 
segments and manage to transmit these demands to political actors and state 
elites relatively effectively and it is based on these arguments that civil society 
and civil society organizations have been given special importance as a 
necessary condition and an important factor for promoting democracy in 
Turkey (Heper and Keyman, 1998: 272). 
  
 It is expected that by carrying the analysis out of the common circles 
that focused on activities, institutionalisation and background of political and 
state elites, this study will try to contribute to the democratic consolidation 
studies in Turkey and provide a more comprehensive picture of the subject in 
question. In order to fulfil the above-mentioned task, first I will analyse the 
concept in question by: 
1. Presenting the theories and conceptual perspectives related to the 
civil society and democratic consolidation; 
2. Setting the functions of civil society that are salient in democratic 
consolidation based on the theoretical and conceptual perspectives 
discussed and, 
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3. Mapping out those functions in the Turkish context by the help of an 
empirical model.
 9 
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL PERSPECTIVES 
 
 
 Civil society and its linkage with democratic consolidation have come to 
occupy much attention over the last few years. This boosted interest is not 
limited to the academic circles. The importance of the concept is well known 
among the policymakers, practitioners and alike. Civil society is now seen as 
an important element of society next to economy, polity and family. Indeed, 
while it is regarded as a major component of what makes social life possible, 
civil society is also increasingly seen as ‗problematic‘ and fast-changing, and 
in many ways as something that can no longer be taken for granted.  
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 In the following paragraphs I will discuss the theoretical approaches to 
civil society and democratic consolidation. By this way I hope to clarify the 
pertinence of these terms in the literature. Then I will provide explanation 
about the employment of these concepts as basic notions of this thesis. While 
doing so, I will particularly indicate the characteristics of civil society that are 
salient in democratic consolidation in terms of scale and scope and its 
potential strengths and weaknesses. 
 
2.1. Civil Society 
 As the struggles of nations over democracy have become intense 
during the last decades of our century, scholars and policy makers from both 
ends of the intelligentsia and political spectrum have converged to reawaken 
and reinvent the antique eighteenth-century notion of civil society. This 
resurgence of  interest in civil society, changed the old attributions attached to 
the concept and relocated it to the status of being a key area for the possible 
democratisation of the world that we live in. With this updated function, the 
concept is now increasingly used to define the space of social activity and 
societal organizations that directly or indirectly support, promote or struggle for 
democracy, democratisation and democratic consolidation (Grugel, 2002: 93).  
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The meanings of civil society have varied enormously across time, 
place, theoretical perspective, and political persuasion. Different political 
ideologies identify civil society nearly with everything from multi-party systems 
and the rights of citizenship to individual voluntarism and the spirit of 
community (Seligman, 2001: 203). For example according to Shils (1991: 4) 
civil society refers to a part in the society which is beyond the boundaries of 
both family and state and has an existence on its own. Shils argue that civil 
society a) covers various autonomous organizations, b) connect itself to state 
with a legal framework and c) encapsulates the civil conducts within the 
particular society that it operates. All these three areas have ties to the 
democratic maturity. He argues that the absolute distinction between state and 
civil society is not acceptable since both state and civil society are subject to 
constitutions and laws that define their boundaries (Shils, 1991: 4-5). 
However, this relationship is not an easy one since it is mainly the state that 
has the power of enacting laws. Additionally civil society needs a state that 
voluntarily listens to the demands of civil society. Within such kind of a 
framework the characteristics of state civil society relationship, depends on the 
degree of ―civility‖ among individuals (Shils, 1991: 16).  For Shils, civility is ―an 
attitude of attachment to the institutions that constitute civil society ….. [and] 
concern for the good of society‖ (Shils, 1991: 11). By this definition Shils refers 
to an area of mutual responsibility among citizens where different parts of 
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society are treated as equals. Therefore civil society acts as an encourager of 
the attitude of civility that will eventually contribute to the democratic 
consolidation.  
 
Michael Walzer‘s conception of civil society may also be utilized when 
the concept‘s relationship with democratic betterment is concerned. According 
to him, in modern democracies individual citizens do not have active but 
passive roles within the decision making processes (Walzer, 1992: 90). At this 
point civil society appears as an important area where citizens join the 
decision making processes through civil societal institutions such as unions, 
movements and interest groups etc. (Walzer, 1992: 99). This point is quite 
important since by this way citizens have the chance of channelling their 
ideas, opinions and demands to the state and eventually this framework 
creates chances for democratic maturity. However he introduces an interesting 
paradox by perceiving state as an ―organization‖ among various organizations 
of civil society. Since it is the state that determines the legal boundaries of civil 
society, it occupies an area within the civil society. Hence we can talk about a 
bilateral relationship between state and civil society: ―only a democratic state 
can create a democratic civil society and only a democratic civil society can 
sustain a democratic state‖ (Walzer, 1992: 104).  
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This latter point was further elaborated by White (1994: 379). He 
questioned the democratization potential of the civil society organizations and 
points out the possible depreciative effect of civil societal organizations on 
democratic development. According to White one should make distinctions 
between various types of civil society. He points out these types as a) 
―modern‖ interest groups and ―traditional‖ groups based on kinship or ethnicity; 
b) informal social networks that are based on patrimonial or clientelistic 
relationships; c) illegal organizations such as Mafia and d) associations that try 
to change the existing political regime (White, 1994: 380). White argues that 
these organizations depending on the conjuncture may act against democratic 
maturity and be supportive of authoritarian regimes. So it is not possible to 
argue that a ―strong‖ civil society is contributive to democratic development at 
all conditions. Also the idea that a ―weak‖ civil society is not contributory to 
democratization is a vague idea (White, 1994: 380). 
 
By this framework White tries to differentiate the ―ideal type‖ and ―actual 
reality‖ of civil society. According to him for instance in the genuine conditions 
the distinction between state and civil society is generally murky, they can 
shape each other both in democratic and non-democratic ways (White, 1994: 
 14 
 
381). So the characteristics of democratic development are highly dependent 
on the interaction between state and civil society (White, 1994: 385). 
Additionally, the nature of democratic participation within civil societal 
organizations as well as their relationship among each other is also a 
determining factor for the consolidation of democracy (White, 1994: 389).  
  
An alternative approach for understanding civil society was developed 
by Cohen and Arato (1994). They locate the civil society above the private 
sphere (that consist of families) and associational sphere (that consist of 
voluntary associations) and perceive ―civil society as a sphere of social 
interaction between economy and state‖ (Cohen and Arato, 1994: ix). 
According to the writers civil society embodies the ―structures of socialization, 
association and organized forms of communication of the life world to the 
extent that these are institutionalized (Cohen and Arato, 1994: x). This is a 
definition neither based on society nor state. They prefer to define civil society 
not as a unified but as a plural and differentiated social structure (Cohen and 
Arato, 1994: 697). They give special importance to the social movements as a 
crucial element of a modern civil society and a form of citizen participation. 
These movements will help to expand the area of rights and hence will 
contribute to further democratization (Cohen and Arato, 1994: 20). 
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Writers also think that the relationship between the political and civil 
societies is also exigent for the democratic maturity. Within the forms of 
representative democracies, political society not only conceives civil society 
but also it should be open to the guidance of civil society (Cohen and Arato, 
1994: 413). Then again, like Walzer and Shils, Cohen and Arato thinks that the 
boundaries of civil society should be determined by the state and legal order. If 
state does not exceed the legal boundaries and intervene in the civil society, it 
is expected that the civil society would be more contributive to democratic 
development (Cohen and Arato, 1994: 19). Additionally writers think that the 
democracy may only be developed to its best at the level of civil society since 
the functioning of civil societal organizations display high degrees of 
egalitarian and participatory character when compared to the organizations 
located in political sphere like political parties (Cohen and Arato, 1994: 417). 
  
Norton‘s ideas may be fruitful at this point for carrying out the 
discussion of civil society out of western circles. He defines civil society as ―a 
melange of associations, clubs, guilds, syndicates, federations, unions, parties 
and groups come together to provide a buffer between state and citizen‖ 
(Norton, 1995: 7). He agrees with Shils on the idea of ―civility‖ as an important 
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ingredient of civil society. He extends the application of the concept of ―civility 
within‖ the civil societal associations to ―civility among‖ the associations 
(Norton, 1995: 12). Although he thinks that the level of civility is quite low or 
absent in the Middle Eastern context, since the art of association can be 
learned, there is a prospect of launching a form of civil society within this 
particular context (Norton, 1995: 12). 
  
Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan‘s contribution to this discussion is 
particularly important because of their special reference to the civil society‘s 
relationship to the democratic consolidation. They define civil society as the 
―arena of polity where self-organizing and relatively autonomous groups, 
movements and individuals attempt to articulate values to create associations 
and solidarities and to advance their interests‖ (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 17). 
For writers, the existence of civil society is a necessary condition for the 
consolidation of democracy. However the existence of civil society should be 
supported by the existence of autonomous political society, rule of law, state 
bureaucracy and institutionalized economic society (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 
18). 
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Similar to Linz and Stepan, Larry Diamond focuses on the features of 
civil society that serve for the development and consolidation of democracy.  
He defines the civil society as ―the realm of organized social life that is open, 
voluntary, self generating, largely self-supporting, relatively autonomous from 
state and bound by a legal order or set of shared values‖ (Diamond, 1999: 
221). By this definition it is possible for citizens to come together under the 
umbrella of civil society for exchanging information, expressing interests and 
channel demands to the accountable state officials (Diamond, 1994: 5). 
  
For Diamond civil society encapsulates diverse sets of organizations 
both formal and informal including economic (commercial associations and 
networks), cultural (religious, ethnic and communal organizations), 
informational and educational (organizations which try to produce and 
disseminate knowledge), interest based (groups like professional associations 
and trade unions), developmental (organizations which aim to improve the 
quality of life of the community), issue-oriented (movements for environmental 
protection, rights of women and alike) and lastly civic organizations (groups 
working in activities like election monitoring, voter education etc. in a non-
partisan fashion) (Diamond, 1994: 6).  
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Diamond proposes a twelve item list for assessing the democratic 
functions of civil society: 1) checking, limiting and monitoring the power of the 
state, 2) supplementing the role of political parties in stimulating participation, 
3) development of democratic attributes through education, 4) providing 
multiple channels for interest representation beyond political parties, 5) 
mitigating principal polarities of political conflict and hence surpass clientelism, 
6) generating cross-cutting interests that will mitigate the political polarities, 7) 
recruiting and training new political leaders, 8) creating organizations with 
explicit democracy-building goals (e.g. election monitoring), 9) disseminating 
information and empowering citizens so they can defend their interests, 
spread of new information and ideas 10) providing basis for reform policies 11) 
conflict mediation and resolution and 12) enhancing ―the accountability, 
responsiveness, inclusiveness, effectiveness, and hence legitimacy of the 
political system by fulfilling the above listed items‖ (Diamond, 1999: 239-250). 
According to Diamond ―the more active pluralistic, resourceful, institutionalized 
and democratic is civil society, and the more effectively it balances the 
tensions in its relations with the state ….. the more likely it is that democracy  
will emerge and endure‖ (Diamond, 1994: 11). The definition and 
democratization functions of civil society provided by Diamond will be utilized 
for the purposes of this thesis in a different manner which will be explained in 
the methodology chapter. 
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From the discussion above I will try to extract a working definition that 
will provide a base for methodological problems and empirical applications of 
this study. To that end, I presented the discussions about civil society with 
special reference to its democratization abilities. The conception of civil society 
as a guard against the powerful state (Keane, 1988: 39-44) and the view of 
civil society as the source of civic education (Boussard, 2003: 75) can be 
added as two last important points. These two approaches are important 
because both conceptualize civil society within the frameworks of pluralism 
and civic education, which foresees voluntary associations, as agents for 
serving democracy by assisting the development of democratic values like 
trust tolerance and compromise, which were further utilized in the democratic 
consolidation literature since 1990s. 
  
Therefore, in compliance with above framework, I will use the term civil 
society as ―the realm of organized social life that is open, voluntary, self 
generating, largely self-supporting, relatively autonomous from state and 
bound by a legal order or set of shared values.‖ (Diamond, 1999: 221) This is 
an operational definition of civil society for the purposes of this thesis. It does 
not attempt to define all aspects of civil society, nor does it necessarily fit 
different perspectives and approaches equally well. What the definition does, 
however, is to list elements and components that most attempts to define civil 
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society would identify as essential.  Such kind of a theoretical approach gives 
the chance of analyzing the different constitutive blocks of the democratic 
progress in different locations and periods. Thus it constitutes a suitable base 
for the analysis of the constitutive block of civil society in the context of Turkey. 
 
2.2. Democratic Consolidation 
Analysis of democratic consolidation requires the discussion, a priori, of 
two significant and related concepts: democracy and transition to democracy. 
Democracy is a complex notion whose definition varies from minimalist, 
procedural criteria to normative criteria. Definitional variations of the notion of 
democracy correlate with the recent global emergence of democratization that 
produced many diverse forms of democracies. Since an amplified discussion 
on democracy and transition to democracy is out of the scope of this study, the 
following paragraphs will mainly touch upon the key components of these 
subjects and the main discussion will be related to the democratic 
consolidation.  
 
  
As a ―wave‖, during the last two decades of 20th century, more than 60 
countries shifted from authoritarian settings to democratic ones (Diamond, 
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1999). This shift produced an extensive amount of literature on the nature and 
characteristics of these new democracies. Basically, the focus of this literature 
is two folded: the analysis on transitions themselves and the analysis on the 
consolidation of these democracies (Mainwaring, 1992: 294). To start with, a 
widespread inclination in these discussions of transition is attaching some 
adjectives to democracy and categorizes the democratic practices accordingly. 
The result of worldwide democratic developments has been the adoption of 
what the political scientists David Collier and Steven Levitsky (1997: 431) call 
"democracy with adjectives.'' Some of these qualified notions are: "hybrid 
regime" "semi-democracy,'' "virtual democracy" "electoral democracy" "illiberal 
democracy" "delegative democracy" "pseudo-democracy,'' "feckless 
democracy" "competitive authoritarianism,'' "facade democracy" "weak 
democracy" "formal democracy" and ―partial democracy‖ (Levitsky and Way, 
2002: 55-57). 
 
 
All of these categorizations call for some basic terms like freedom, rule 
of law, elections and alike. These terms are among the basic requirements for 
a democratic system but they lack as being adequate sources for a research 
on democratic consolidation. The ―wave‖ approach generally identifies 
democracy with the institutional setups with their decision-making procedures 
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and mainly the centre of attention is on the electoral processes, where citizens 
are democratic actors who can choose among different contestants. This 
Schumpeterian understanding of democracy (1943), foresees habitual 
elections as the single and sufficient tool of participation in a democratic 
system. A follower of the Schumpeterian definition, Huntington sees a political 
system as ―democratic, to the extent that its most powerful collective decision 
makers were selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which 
candidates freely compete for votes‖ and democracy is no guarantee against 
bad government policies, but the population can punish the government at the 
following election (1991: 16). Hence three aspects were identified as central 
components of democracy: competition, participation and political rights. 
Although these may be counted among the basic requirements for a 
democratic system, they are far from being adequate sources for a research 
on democratic consolidation. These theories adopt a quite simplistic 
understanding of democracy that equates it with the elections without giving 
importance on dimensions like civil liberties or nature of party systems and 
alike. As proposed by Philippe Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl (1994: 182) the 
dominant variable of elections may end with the fallacy of electoralism. 
Additionally, the world experienced the cases of representative democracies 
that have low levels of governmental accountability and poor public influence 
on decision making. Notwithstanding its ability to envision democratic 
 23 
 
consolidation beyond national experiences, wave theory does not address the 
processes of democratic consolidation as a process and rather it employs 
generalisations with fewer criterions for democratic consolidation. (Korkut, 
2003: 28).  
 
In his discussion on transitions to democracy Juan Linz (1990: 25) 
refers to these difficulties by stating that there is no scholarly consensus on 
how to define consolidation. Conceptions on consolidation range from a 
minimalist one i.e. existence of fair and regular elections to the digestion of 
democratic values among the all levels of society. Andreas Schedler (1998: 
91) argues that the addition of many qualifiers to the concept of democratic 
consolidation have altered the concept ‗beyond recognition‘. Despite this 
critical consolidation observation, Schedler suggests that although the concept 
of democratic consolidation appears as an ‗omnibus concept, a garbage-can 
concept, a catch-all concept, lacking a core meaning‘ analysts do not face a 
dead-end road. He suggests that if the researcher can identify the meaning 
and the boundaries of his conception on democratic consolidation and put 
forward the empirical cases, then it is possible to have an analytical base.  So 
the employment of the term rests on a particular analyst's empirical facts and 
analytical ends (Schedler 1998: 92). 
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Alternatively, democratic consolidation is understood as an end product 
of different historical practices that the democratic systems had experienced. 
Within this understanding, the central postulation is that democratisation will 
take place once the structural features, such as high per capita income, 
widespread literacy, and prevalent urban residence are well placed within the 
system (Grugel, 2002, 49). Lipset‘s (1981) work, which tried to establish 
relation between the democracies and a number of and Almond and Verba‘s 
(1989) study on the relationship between democracy and civic values, may be 
counted among the prominent examples of this approach.  All these works and 
others presume that consolidation can only be reached under the 
circumstances of performing a number of preconditions, which are assumed to 
be related with democracy. This theory comes with the danger of 
overstressing the significance of structural features and hence leaves no room 
for evaluating interactions among actors of democratisation and the 
implications of these interactions on the process of consolidation.   
 
Yet another explanation of democratization proposes the idea that the 
process is highly dependent on the policies of governing and opposing elites 
(Przeworski, 1992 and O‗Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, 1986). Within 
this process the interaction between diverse elite groups determines the kind 
of regime that ultimately emerges. Thus, various elite groups seem to be the 
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determinant actors on the regime change and establishment. Accordingly it is 
these elite groups that determine the nature of the regime change, neither the 
process itself nor the legacies. Democracy, thus, can be established 
autonomously from the structural context where at the same time the 
population is regarded only as an onlooker. This approach is criticized 
because of its strong emphasis on the actors (Pridham, 1995, 166).  
 
 One last approach to review is historical sociology, which 
methodologically favours ‗legacies‘ as key variables. It is different than the 
modernization theories in the sense that it displays an interest in explaining 
outcomes with a state-centred view (Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, 
1985). Instead of excessively society-based accounts of political change, this 
theory concentrates on other forces in society. Accordingly state strength, for 
instance, may enable the state to overpower the pro-democratic forces in the 
rest of the society. Moreover, many structures and constellations persist, and 
are influential beyond their original or historical mandates. Hence, previous 
state structures and regime forms shape later political developments. However 
there is a danger of equating processes of democratic consolidation entirely 
through the influence of structures. After all, the process of democratic 
consolidation is more than a prolongation of the transition from authoritarian 
rule (Schmitter and Karl 1994, 175).  
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Questioning structural determinants of democracy, however, should not 
solely credit the work of individual agents in laying the framework for the 
process of democratic consolidation. Still, one must recognise the importance 
of various forms of interactions among the structures, elites and the ordinary 
citizens in all processes of democratic consolidation. Hence, a proper 
description of the groundwork for democratic consolidation must account for 
the complex interaction between agents and structures in confusing conditions 
(Schmitter and Karl 1994, 175).  
 
A key question that this study seeks to address is: under what 
circumstances may democratic consolidation as a process can be developed? 
According to O'Donnell (1992: 45), consolidation calls for  
 
‗political institutions specific to democracy the 
emergence of regularized and predictable practices 
which are generally and habitually respected, which 
are embodied in public organizations capable of 
processing the demands of politically active sectors of 
society with little or no disruption or violence, and 
which are in line with rules of the competitive game 
which   prohibits suppressing that competitiveness.‘ 
 
Institutions are crucial in the consolidation process, for the path to 
democratic consolidation is ―obstructed or destroyed by the effects of 
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institutional shallowness and decay‖. Political institutions are crucial for 
democratic consolidation because they promote ―not only political trust and 
cooperation among political actors‖ but also ―tolerance, civility and loyalty to 
the democratic system‖ (Diamond, 1992: 75). 
 
Democratic institutions help to solve political conflict according to 
procedural norms that ―eschew violence or other polarizing forms of behavior 
that could be a threat to the maintenance of civil order‖ (Gunther, Puhle and 
Diamandouros, 1995: 9). Without autonomous functioning institutions, 
O'Donnell (1992: 22) contends, 'any degree of democratization achieved is 
precarious and explosive. Independent institutions help to promote horizontal 
accountability potentially because the latter requires state agencies that have 
the power, both de jure and de facto, to oversee and to impose criminal 
penalties on any illegal activities committed by other state agencies and their 
leaders. Without independent institutions, actions of elites are constrained only 
by the 'the hard facts of existing power relations' (O‘Donnell, 1992: 60). In 
political a situation in which everyone is trying to get ahead politically and 
economically, without rules and regulations, the consequence is naked use of 
power. 
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With the absence of strong, autonomous institutions, newly emerged 
democracy is likely to be consumed by the existence of non-formalized but 
strongly operative practices such as clientelism, patrimonialism, and 
corruption. Patron-client and patrimonial linkages form networks through which 
the political elite dominate the society and weaken political opponents. These 
networks are used to ensure the accumulation and extension of power for 
different political factions. Thus, in order to increase their power base, political 
elites need to increase their patronage networks. The widespread existence of 
a well-functioning patronage system not only undercuts the function of political 
institutions but also hampers the reform of existing institutions and the 
establishment of new institutions. 
 
 
When civil society‘s role on democratic consolidation one last approach 
seems worthwhile to analyze: the role of political elites. Elite behavior and 
interactions, collectively termed "elite political culture" play an indispensable 
role in the process of democratic consolidation. "Without question" Diamond 
writes, "elite political culture is crucial to democratic consolidation." Democracy 
would not function without elites' acceptance of the regularity and predictability 
of "the rules, and limit of constitutional system and legitimacy of opposing 
actors who similarly commit themselves…‖(Diamond, 1999: 173). According to 
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Diamond the significance of elite political culture in the process of democratic 
consolidation is twofold. First, elites' political decisions are contingent on their 
beliefs. Second, as leaders of a polity the magnitude of their impact on political 
events is high (Diamond, 1999: 66). 
 
Buton et. al. also emphasize the role of the elites, especially their 
consensus on the legitimacy of democratic institutions and rules, in the 
process of democratic consolidation. Although they acknowledge that 
structural, institutional and cultural factors are important, they hold the firm 
belief that "elite convergence" a process of interaction among elites, will 
eventually lead to "elite consensual unity, thereby laying the basis for 
consolidated democracy‖ (Burton, Gunther and Higley, 1992:  xi) 
 
Consolidation also requires that political elites display action that 
"respects each other's rights to compete peacefully for power, eschews 
violence, and obeys the laws, the constitution, and mutually accepted norms of 
political conduct" (Diamond, 1999: 68). Furthermore, elites should also be 
committed to the maintenance of a peaceful environment by avoiding "rhetoric 
that would incite their followers to violence, intolerance, or illegal methods. 
Political leaders do not attempt to use the military for political advantage" 
(Diamond, 1999: 69). 
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As long as the elites have consensus and agreement on the democratic 
rules and procedures, democratic norms and practices will become embedded 
first at the elite level and then radiate throughout the polity, establishing a firm 
foundation for democratic consolidation.  
 
 
 My basic thought is that democratic consolidation takes place as a 
result of complex interactions among and between different actors. Moreover 
the meaning attached to democratic consolidation varies according to contexts 
and goals. In line with that, the new modernization theories offer a 
developmental understanding of democratic consolidation as a system of 
power and politics that emerges in fragments or parts, by no fixed sequence or 
timetable (Diamond 1999, 16). The constitutive blocks of the democratic 
progress like, the appearance of new parties, the development of civil society, 
movement toward consensus about rules etc. establishes the foundations for 
further democratic maturity. Such kind of a theoretical approach gives the 
chance of analyzing the different constitutive blocks (i.e. civil society) of the 
democratic progress in different locations and periods.  
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 Thenceforth, by and large, this essay will recognize the term democratic 
consolidation as a process with multiple dimensions. All democracies face the 
risk of electoralism and legitimacy problems and these problems may be 
eliminated by ―maximizing the opportunities for individuals to influence the 
conditions in which they live, and to participate in and influence debates about 
the key decisions that affect their society‖ (Korkut, 2003: 33). To that end, I 
think the cooperative achievement of individuals will be equally important as 
individual/elite contribution to the democratic consolidation. Hence joint and 
constructive involvement of citizens may be counted as one of the crucial 
element of the process of democratic consolidation and this involvement is 
only possible trough civil society.   
 
2.3. Civil Society and Democratic Consolidation Discussions in the 
Turkish Context 
The following paragraphs will provide general/historical information 
about the formation and development of civil society in Ottoman-Turkish 
continuum. My priority here is to focus on the civil society-state relationship 
and trace the signs of the above discussion in the Turkish context. By this way 
I hope to assemble a system for understanding the civil society‘s linkage with 
democratic consolidation in Turkish setting. 
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The history of Western Europe on many instances refers to the salient 
struggle between state and the decentralised power nodes. The Ottoman-
Turkish case however rests on a different base where the centre did not 
confront any significant negating powers. Besides the Ottoman-Turkish polity 
which was shaped by the exaggerated fear of anarchy and rebellion and did 
not leave enough room for the representation of social interests (Mardin, 1973: 
173). Under such conditions state becomes the dominant side in its 
relationship with civil society and defines the nature of the relationship. As 
Heper (1991a, 13) mentions for the Turkish case the struggle between state 
and civil society was insignificant since the power was concentrated on the 
state.   
 
In the Ottoman-Turkish continuum the establishment of new republic 
started an important era in with respect to state society relations. As an 
attempt to launch a modern society and state the new republic tried to 
reorganize the state society relations. Religion a) as being the sole area that 
was shared between society and the state and b) acting as the source of 
legitimacy for the state was replaced by secularism. This replacement altered 
the state society relations by introducing secular law instead of sheria. On the 
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whole, the project of new republic aimed a democratic western society. 
However, the new republic tried to effectuate this aim, mostly as an inherited 
practice from Ottoman Empire, by dividing the society into two big segments of 
elites and masses. As the emissaries of long-term interests of the state 
bureaucratic elites demanded the conformity of masses with their decisions to 
realize the above-mentioned aim. Eventually this paradoxical behaviour ended 
up creating a bureaucratic society rather than a civil society (Belge, 1986: 
1920). On the conditions where states tried to ―wrap the societies‖ within grand 
projects, it is too hard to find the accommodating conditions for the 
establishment of a vivid civil society. Because in order to attain the ―grand aim‖ 
which was agreed on by bureaucratic elites, all parts of society should work 
hard in great concinnity, without vocalizing their differences. When civil society 
concerned, the outcome of such kind of a practice is the evanescing of 
societal forces that has the potential of instituting the civil society (Gevgilili, 
1990: 118).  
 
When the civil society concerned, the passage to the new republic from 
Ottoman setting generated two diametrical results. The first of them is the 
consolidation of state‘s power over society. The modernization project of 
republic, which was enforced by bureaucratic elite, tried to manipulate the 
masses according to the necessities of the grand project of modernization. 
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Within this setting the people were not treated as citizens that constitutive 
elements of republic but as masses that needs guidance. Hence the power of 
state was not based on citizens, but on this grand project (Insel, 1996: 120). 
This situation limited the formation of civil society in a great deal. However, as 
a second result, we also espy the matutinal signs of civil society as well during 
this period. As Çaha (1997: 258) points out the formation new parties, 
associations, newspapers, publications and legal arrangements related to 
women, family and alike might be counted among positive developments 
related to civil society. When we contrast these two results we might say that 
the ascendancy of the former over latter shaped the future of civil society in 
the new Turkish republic. Although the grand project of modernization includes 
the formation of civil society, the bureaucratic elites as the executers of this 
project had chosen not to provide autonomy to civil society and accordingly 
the structures of civil society were partly installed among the Turkish setting 
(Belge, 1986: 1920). 
 
The multi party period, which started after 1946, constitutes another 
turning point for the civil society in Turkey. By the help of spaces that opened 
up for alternative ideas, the forces of civil society became more visible within 
the society. However within this new architecture, still the ―red-lines‖ of Turkish 
state were valid. Basically, the state drew out two fundamental principles for 
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the administration of Turkish society. The first one is secularism, which was 
inherited from the single party period and the second one is anti-communism. 
Any kind of formation within the civil society should take these limits into 
consideration.  
 
The number of associations augmented considerably during the multi 
party period (Toksöz, 1983: 373). For example the legalization of unions under 
the Trade Union Law of 1947 paved the way for the slow but steady growth of 
a labor movement that evolved parallel to multiparty politics. With the help of 
the Law related to the Labour Unions in 1947 the number of such 
organizations reached to 394 in 1958 (Sakallıoğlu, 1987: 130). The principal 
goal of unions as defined in the 1947 law was to seek the betterment of 
members' social and economic status. Unions were denied the right to strike 
or to engage in political activity, either on their own or as vehicles of political 
parties. In spite of these limitations, labor unions gradually acquired political 
influence. The Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Türkiye Isçi Sendikalari 
Konfederasyonu--Türk-Is) was founded in 1952 with government‘s instigation 
to serve as an independent umbrella group. Under the tutelage of Türk-Is, 
labor evolved into a well-organized interest group; the organization also 
functioned as an agency through which the government could restrain 
workers' wage demands.  
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  The increase in quantity, however, did not reflect the quality of these 
organizations as democratic agents. Since some major labour unions were 
established by political parties of the period to backup their policies Sakallıoğlu 
(1987: 224) labels them as corporatist organizations that helped the control of 
state. This approach of state towards civil society organizations is also visible 
on state‘s policy on chambers and bars. Similar to unions, by organizing 
chambers and bars as semi-arms of state and providing limited pluralism, the 
state managed to set up a control mechanism over the economic activities. As 
such, state tried to mould the labour unions as agents, which will cooperate 
with the state for the long-term interests of the republic. 
 
Another problem of newly formed associations as democratic agents 
was related to the legal arrangements of their existence. For example the Law 
on Associations did not provide enough space for associations to act as the 
nodes of opposition within society (Turgut, 1984: 270). Consequently, the 
organizations of civil society preferred to be close to the state rather than to 
the society. Even though this predilection helped these organizations to 
survive, they did not manage to articulate interests that differ from the interests 
of state. 
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As a result of the economic and political crises between 1954 and 1960, 
the army decided to intervene and seized the power. The bureaucratic elite 
thought that the system was functioning not in accordance with the ―grand 
project‖ and decided to get back to power and reshape the political system. A 
new constitution was planned and introduced by the temporary military 
government. The 1961 constitution was carrying out some positive elements 
for the improvement of civil society. The autonomy granted for universities and 
media, the assurance of basic rights to organize, publicize and declare ideas, 
the social state principal were to name some.  
 
The socio-economic relaxation and stability of society associated with 
the expanded areas of freedom contributed to the refreshment of civil society. 
For example, during 1960‘s, according to the findings of Özbudun (1975: 80) 
the number of associations was increased nearly 20 times when it is 
compared with the previous decade. The labor movement expanded in the 
liberalized political climate of the 1960s, especially after a union law enacted in 
1963 legalized strikes, lockouts, and collective bargaining. However, unions 
were forbidden to give "material aid" to political parties. Political parties also 
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were barred from giving money to unions or forming separate labor 
organizations. 
 
Turkish society went through a high level of politicization and 
polarization during 1960s and 1970s. Civil society organizations and especially 
unions were no exceptions. Workers' dissatisfaction with Türk-Is as the 
representative of their interests led to the founding in 1967 of the 
Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' Trade Unions of Turkey (Türkiye 
Devrimçi Isçi Sendikalari Konfederasyonu--DISK). DISK leaders were expelled 
from Türk-Is after supporting a glass factory strike opposed by the Türk-Is 
bureaucracy. Both Türk-Is and the government tried to suppress DISK, whose 
independence was perceived as a threat. However, a spontaneous, two-day, 
pro-DISK demonstration by thousands of laborers in Istanbul--the first mass 
political action by Turkish workers--forced the government in June 1970 to 
back away from a bill to abolish DISK. For the next ten years, DISK remained 
an independent organization promoting the rights of workers and supporting 
their job actions, including one major general strike in 1977 that led to the 
temporary abolition of the military-run State Security Courts.  
 
During 1960s the economic choice made in favour of import substitutive 
strategies generated some important affects on labour unions. Since labour 
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factor is understood as a factor of demand rather than cost under the import 
substitutive strategy, it helped to the potency of labour unions and forced the 
establishment of congruity among employer unions and labour unions 
(Keyder, 1993: 71). However, the negotiating power of unions diminished due 
to the severe discordances among and within the organizations. As a result of 
these disagreements many small, segmented and inoperative unions 
established that put a threat on the congruity above. Later the increased 
number of strikes and demonstrations were perceived as the ―rehearsal of 
socialist revolution‖ by the Turkish armed forces and used as one of the 
―legitimation tools‖ for the 1971 memorandum. 
 
The domination of state elites as sole commissionaires of the long 
terms of state resumed within these periods. These elites had the idea that the 
problems of Turkey may only be solved by an ―order‖ which should be based 
on a bureaucratic system. The indispensable result of this perspective was the 
further centralization/bureaucratisation of state. The harvest of this strategy on 
civil society was especially become visible on professional chambers and 
associations. During this period a number of laws passed in order to restrict 
the activities and organize chambers and associations with branches and sub 
branches throughout the country in order to ease the state control over these 
organizations (Tosun, 2001: 283). 
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As described above the execution of 1960 constitution opened up new 
horizons for civil society in Turkey. However these credits were reversed with 
the 1971 coup by the termination of white-collar worker unions and youth 
associations and limiting the activities of labour unions and chambers. The 
tendency of civil society organizations acting as semi bureaucratic arms of 
state became quite visible during this period. For example The Confederation 
of Turkish Trade Unions (Turk-Is) was one of the contributors to the 
groundwork of Law no 1317 that limits the activities of syndicates. With the 
Revolutionary Labour Unions Confederation (DISK), Turk-Is were among the 
eager applauders of the 1971 coup. In spite of their support, these 
organizations tuned out to be the main sufferers of the coups (Isikli, 1990: 
388). 
 
The policies of post 1960 epoch produced a relatively liberal opening 
within the social and political spheres. However within the economic sphere 
the choice was made in accordance with a state centred development plans. 
Although these openings created opportunities for civil society, especially the 
state‘s dominant position within the economic sphere spilled over to the other 
spheres of society and hindered the development of democratic practices 
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among civil society (Tosun, 2001: 285). For example according to Sakallioglu 
(1987: 246) organizations like Turk-Is, TOBB, (The Union of Chambers and 
Commodity Exchanges of Turkey) and alike were openly utilized by DP 
government as control centres of societal order. After the 1971 memorandum, 
with a series of amendments on laws related to the autonomy of unions, media 
organizations universities and alike the increments of the previous decade 
were nearly forfeited. According to Ahmad (1995: 220) the 1973 constitution 
and sequential laws tried to extinguish all kinds of opposition, debilitate unions 
and universities.  
 
This trend of military was also reiterated during the 1980 coup with 
further limitations on every aspect of civil and political life. According to Koker 
(1995: 71) the transition period after 1980 coup was labelled by three policies. 
a) the renunciation of the state centred economic policies and replacement of 
these policies by market oriented economic policies; b) the preparation of new 
constitution and laws and c) a new cultural policy that mitigates the principle of 
secularism.     
 
By and large the new market oriented economic policies of post 1980 
was enforced by the military. Since the new policies are on the whole worked 
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in favor of the bourgeoisie, this context machined collaboration between the 
military and the bourgeoisie. As Bulutay (1970: 91) writes this collaboration 
was first established during 1960s by appointment of military bureaucrats to 
the executive boards of important companies. 
 
It is clear that the economic policies of post 1980 created employment, 
expanded foreign trade and investments and with the progression of private 
entrepreneurship the space of state within the economic sphere was reduced 
(Turan, 1998: 203). The reduced responsibility of state within economic sphere 
ended up with the discussions about state‘s space within the social space. 
Hence these economic policies provided an accommodating framework for an 
expansion of civil society (Turan, 1997: 21). Accordingly, during the 1980‘s the 
power of labour unions was waned, chambers and industrial organizations 
became more salient within the civil societal sphere. 
 
The military elites of 1980 coup openly discriminated some of the civil 
society organizations against others. While the labor unions and associations 
with leftist tendencies (such as DISK, Peace Association and alike) were 
closed and punished severely, the others that presented close ties to state 
(such as TUSIAD, TOBB and others) managed to survive (Tosun, 2001: 302). 
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The military bureaucracy displayed its mistrust to civil societal organizations 
and as Özbudun (1995b: 29) writes they perceived these organizations as 
institutions that are under the influence of political parties with the obliquity to 
radicalism. Hence it would be plausible to argue that the Turkish state after the 
1980 coup was restructured and this new structure would be in favor of state 
rather than the civil society.  
 
Following the 1980 coup, the military regime banned independent union 
activity, suspended DISK, and arrested hundreds of its activists, including all 
its top officials. Meanwhile, the more complaisant Türk-Is, which had not been 
outlawed after the coup, worked with the military government and its 
successors to depoliticize workers. As the government-approved labor union 
confederation, Türk-Is benefited from new laws pertaining to unions. For 
example, the 1982 constitution permits unions but prohibits them from 
engaging in political activity, thus effectively denying them the right to petition 
political representatives. As in the days prior to 1967, unions must depend 
upon Türk-Is to mediate between them and the government. The original form 
of 1982 constitution restricted the establishment of new trade unions and 
places constraints on the right to strike by banning politically motivated strikes, 
general strikes, solidarity strikes, and any strike considered a threat to society 
or national well-being. Hence it is not surprising that the 1982 constitution was 
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designed as a tool for state to intervene to all possible areas of social and 
political life (Tanor, 1986: 154). As Soysal (1986: 190) points out 1982 
constitution gives clear priority to state‘s interests over its citizens. Especially 
when the limitations on the freedom of press and freedom of association 
concerned state tried to protect itself against every possible power node.  
 
The evolution of chambers and bars display similarities with unions. 
They were organized as semi-autonomous bodies under the 1961 constitution. 
1982 constitution also made amendments related to these organizations and 
transmuted them into occupational organizations with responsibilities to state. 
The Turkish Trade Association (Türkiye Odalar Birligi--TOB) has represented 
the interests of merchants, industrialists, and commodity brokers since 1952. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, new associations representing the interests of private 
industry challenged TOB's position as the authoritative representative of 
business in Turkey. Subsequently the organization came to be identified 
primarily with small and medium-sized firms. The Union of Chambers of 
Industry was founded in 1967 as a coalition within TOB by industrialists 
seeking to reorganize the confederation. The Union of Chambers of Industry 
was unable to acquire independent status but achieved improved coordination 
of industrialists' demands. By setting up study groups, the union was able to 
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pool research on development projects. In addition, the union organized 
regional Chambers of Industry within TOB. 
 
Business interests also were served by employers' associations that 
dealt primarily with labor-management relations and were united under the 
aegis of the Turkish Confederation of Employers' Unions (Türkiye Isveren 
Sendikalari Konfederasyonu--TISK). This confederation was established in 
1961, largely in response to the development of trade unions, and was 
considered the most militant of employers' associations. Although membership 
in TISK was open to employers in both the private and public sectors, it was 
primarily an organization of private-sector employers. When the military 
regime took power in 1980, labor union activities were suspended, but TISK 
was allowed to continue functioning. Employers supported the subsequent 
restrictive labor legislation, which appeared to be in accord with TISK 
proposals. 
 
Another representative of business interests, the Turkish Industrialists' 
and Businessmen's Association (Türk Sanayiçileri ve Is Adamlari Dernegi--
TÜSIAD), was founded by the leaders of some of Turkey's largest business 
and industrial enterprises soon after the March 1971 military coup. Its aim was 
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to improve the image of business and to stress its concern with social issues. 
At the same time, TÜSIAD favored granting greater control of investment 
capital to the large industrialists at the expense of the smaller merchant and 
banking interests usually supported by TOBB. TÜSIAD's leaders also were 
concerned with the widening economic inequalities between regions and 
social classes and opposed TISK's extreme antilabor policies. 
 
The limitations of 1982 constitution on social and associational life was 
an end result of the phobia against individual freedoms that was amassed 
among military elites. Although amended 11 times up to 2006 the 1982 
constitution with its provisions against associational life thwarted the formation 
of a vivid civil society in Turkey. We can trace the reflections of this on the 
political parties as well. Since the military elite perceived politics and political 
activity with the potential of being dangerous and aberrant, the laws and 
regulations for the political parties displayed a warped configuration. According 
to Parla (1996: 116) the laws and regulations foresaw political parties as 
organizations that refrain from political competition, display absolute harmony 
with the long-term interests of the state and withdraw from power where 
necessary. Within such kind of a contexture, the links between political parties 
and society were cut off and they turned out to be agents of state rather then 
being institutions that vocalize the demands coming from the society.    
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More interestingly, some of the organizations from the civil society 
sphere exposed parallel views with the military elite and supported the 1980 
coup. For example Turk-Is championed the intervention and took part within 
the military government with ‗honour‘`(Parlar, 1997: 128). When asked, Turk-Is 
remarked the supremacy of national unity over any kind of individual right that 
has the potential of disturbing the power of the executive (Gemalmaz, 1995: 
60). Thus Turk-Is was displaying an ultimate example of pragmatism by taking 
part in a non-democratic government with the expectation of organizational 
survival.  
 
With its comprehensive report about the new constitution TISK went 
one-step further than Turk-Is, and demanded new regulations that limit the 
press, proposed the establishment of new state security courts, prohibition of 
labour unions and strikes. According to Gemalmaz (1995: 65) 1982 
constitution is actually the constitution of TISK.  
 
The military elite chose to depoliticise the society and restructure the 
political system according to the above-mentioned principles. These principles 
rebounded by the governments of post 1980 and the political system 
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increasingly braced the executive, suppressed associational life and abated 
the civil society (Kalaycioglu, 1998: 120). However in despite of the 
unfavourable legal conditions, civil societal movements revived after the 
passage to multi party politics in 1983.  
 
The Ottoman-Turkish state tradition has always been described by the 
existence of a strong central state a weak periphery (Mardin, 1969; Mardin 
1973; Heper 1980a; Heper 1985). Starting from the early period the main tool 
for the Ottoman rulers to establish the order within the society was dependent 
on the ―principle of justice‖. Basically it was a circular system starting with the 
protection of citizens by the state; in return citizens produce wealth and pay 
taxes to the state; and in return state will be able to introduce more land to the 
system and in return citizens produce more wealth. This political and social 
structure of Ottoman society fathered not only the fabrication but also the 
segmentation of a number of groups/classes among society with clear-cut 
distinctions. The prominent one was the distinction between the ruler (askeri) 
and the ruled (reaya). The survival of the social system was highly dependent 
on the consent of this asymmetrical relationship between and among these 
groups.  
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According to Mardin (1973: 171), the relationship between the state and 
the society was formulated in a different way within the Ottoman Empire than 
its western counterparts. Basically, the ongoing struggles of state with different 
social groups located at periphery (feudal groups, industrial workers etc.) 
profiled the principles of the central state in western societies. However these 
institutions of west, including the aristocracy, clergy and alike, were absent in 
the Ottoman setting (Özbudun, 1995a: 220). In the dearth of these institutions, 
the relation between state and civil society was set out to be a hierarchical 
one, where the Ottoman state acted on top ―as an umbrella state that covers 
all of the civil societies‖ (Inalcık, 1998: 79). Hence, we observe a fusion of civil 
society to the state in Ottoman Empire, which is a rather different path than the 
Western examples.  
Heper (1985: 35) points out two important outcomes of this system. 
Firstly rather than fulfilling the actual societal demands, the Ottoman state 
gave priority to a number of vague and abstract interests. And secondly state 
officials focused on the survival state rather than a consensus among the 
societal groups. As a result, state was positioned over and beyond the society 
and also religion as a sacred institution that needed to be protected at any 
time for any cost (Mardin, 1990: 180).   
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The survival of such kind of a socio-political system was only possible 
with a strong patrimonial bureaucratic mechanism (Mardin, 1990: 179). The 
main task of the bureaucratic class was to keep societal groups as they are 
and where they are in order for the flawless functioning of the system. Hence 
alternative demands to power and/or any kind of limitation on the power of 
state were not welcomed by the centre. Eventually this framework had a 
negative effect on the formation of civil society in Ottoman-Turkish setting. The 
consent to the state, in return of protection, was institutionalised and 
vigorously internalised by society which had left no room for the establishment 
of alternative power centres. As Mardin puts it, ―The Ottoman state has always 
tried to trace and control the societal movements and reshaped them 
according to the interests of the state‖ (Mardin, 1990: 179). Indisputably this 
system produced some results like the articulation of values of distrust to the 
state, the trepidation from the power of state, malfeasance of law and alike. 
According to (Heper, 1980b: 5) this horizon was inherited by the Turkish 
Republic in the forms of elitism, sanctity of state, use of physical power and 
prejudice to opposition and affected the formation of civil society. 
 
As noted above, the Ottoman social and political system demanded an 
absolute and continuous conformity from its citizens. This demand, at the 
same time,   necessitates a strong state that penetrates into every aspect of 
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social life by limiting the space for civil society. Hence throughout the Ottoman 
experience, state did not mature itself with the inputs provided by civil society. 
Quite the opposite, state limited the area of civil society for the sake of its 
survival. The Ottoman elites were quite careful about controlling any kind of 
power centre that was out of the described legitimate boundaries (Mardin, 
1969: 259). As a result the institutions that have the potential of representing 
the civil society cooperate with the state rather than collecting and transferring 
the demands of their members to the state. This helped to the reproduction of 
the system without any serious grass root opposition. 
 
This situation became problematic especially after the 17th. Century 
when the consent that was necessary among the social groups was started to 
be questioned.  The internal functioning and institutions of Ottoman Empire 
was heavily dependent on the inclusion of new lands to the system. Once the 
expansion of the empire stopped the internal equilibrium of the empire was 
shaken. The all-encompassing power of state began to recede by the 19th 
century with the recognition of individual rights and freedoms, right to property 
and equality before law for the first time the preconditions of a civil society 
were established (Gevgilili, 1986: 35).  
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Still there was not enough room for the establishment of a vivid civil 
society. Deep rooted practice of political elitism of the Ottoman Empire highly 
affected the westernization policies of the Young Turks who were the main 
agents of reforms. Parallel to the old bureaucratic elite of Ottoman Empire, 
Young Turks also thought that the welfare of the society depends on the 
survival of the state. In accordance with this horizon, the bureaucratic elites 
believed that they can produce the necessary solutions for the endurance of 
the state. Hence during the westernization attempts, centre had a strong 
advantage against the unorganized and weak periphery. Consequently the 
reforms aimed the unity of state rather than establishing and expanding the 
basic rights of citizens. This situation was also inherited by the early Turkish 
republic. During the reforms of republic, the motor force behind reforms was 
not the civil society but it was the bureaucratic elite located at the centre. 
Hence the bureaucratic elite had the chance of acting separately from the 
periphery and engineered the reforms without the contribution of citizens.  
 
So thereupon, the modernization attempts of the Turkish Republic has 
been carried out in the same character as it happened in the late Ottoman 
context, where the masses have been considered as inert addressees who 
could be molded in accordance with the principles of the state elite. As Heper 
(2000: 71) suggests, the Ottoman desire for a strong state that would regulate 
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the polity and society from above left a particular imprint on democracy in 
Turkey. 
 
The decline of the Ottoman Empire from the nineteenth century 
onwards and its collapse in the following century deepened the Republican 
elite‘s perception of the need to empower the state in order to maintain 
territorial unity of the country (Gürbey, 2006: 8). Under such circumstances, 
the state elite located at the centre consolidated its power by prioritizing 
themselves as the agents of highest ethical values and consider themselves 
as the teachers of masses. With this horizon, as exampled in the previous 
paragraphs, the state in the republican context sustained its unchallengeable, 
sacred position. The mindset of the state elites that focused on elevating the 
country to the level of contemporary civilization may be utilized as an 
important key for understanding the modernization project and the single-party 
period. As Aydın (2005: 26) puts it, in Turkey the state has located itself 
against society, and treated society as an ―immature mass of people‖, and 
more importantly until the ideal society that they envisioned took place, did not 
hesitate to curtail the ordinary citizens ―ways to participate in politics.‖ 
Additionally as Heper (1985: 51) points out, Atatürk, believed that people had 
to be kept under the strict control of the enlightened elite: ―the people should 
not have sovereignty until their collective conscience reached a certain level. 
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The national will, as shaped by the people, would emerge only to the extent 
that the people become civilized‖. 
 
Mostly the modernization project in Turkey was carried out in a top-
down fashion. Accordingly state elites interpreted the democratic principles on 
their own, which fabricated effects on the formation of civil society in Turkey. 
As Heper (1991b: 49) puts it, 
 
―The state elites took democracy not as the representation 
and reconciliation of the interests and opinions of different 
social groups but as finding the one best policy by the 
enlightened elite, that is, by the State elites themselves. 
Democracy was equated with educated debate among a 
few. For Atatürk, this state of affairs was going to be a 
transient phenomenon, for he believed in the potential of the 
people to develop and become more rational. Only then 
could civil societal elements have their weight in the polity; 
the dominant state could turn into a substantially neutral 
state... After Atatürk passed away, however, the state elites 
on the whole abandoned the belief in the potential of the 
people to develop and become more rational. Thus, they 
converted the Atatürkian approach to politics … into an 
ideology. Not unexpectedly, secularism became the 
backbone of the official ideology in question.‖ 
 
At this point crediting Sartori may be fruitful for a better evaluation of the 
circumstances. Sartori (1987) suggests two dimensions for explaining 
democracy: horizontal and vertical dimensions. The former refers to the liberal 
democratic aspects of democracy (like equality, contribution and alike) and the 
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latter represents the state aspect of democracy (basically the long term 
interests of state). For a strong liberal democracy there should be a 
reasonable balance between these two dimensions. This balance at the same 
time represents the stability between autonomy and control. From the 
discussion above, we observe a disproportion among these dimensions for the 
favour of vertical dimension when the Turkish context concerned.   
 
The above anatomy accentuates the importance of historical processes 
in the building of a strong state against civil society. However with the help of 
historical developments that took place especially after the transition to 
multiparty politics in 1946, spaces for associational activity and pluralist politics 
expanded. According to Toprak (1996: 90-91) the thirty year period between 
1950 and 1980 was characterized by the struggles to set the systems for party 
politics and democratic procedures, guarantee the civil rights and legitimize 
the civil associations. Following these decades especially during 1980s, the 
relatively free environment created by economic liberal policies, affected the 
state society relationship in Turkey. The policies of economic liberalism first 
reduced the role of state within the economic sphere and following that these 
effects were spilled over to the cultural and social spheres and hence helped 
to the reformation of civil society in Turkey.  
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This tendency continued during the 1990s and civil society movements 
expanded both in qualitative and quantitative terms. This inclination elevated 
the importance of civil society and underlined its importance for the democratic 
maturity of Turkish society (Keyman and İçduygu, 2003: 217-232). Both 
decision makers and academia created particular spaces in their agendas for 
discussing the civil society‘s role as a contributor to democratic consolidation. 
During 1980s and 1990s civil society organizations in Turkey initiated the 
verbalization and representation of the interests of various social segments 
and bequeathed these pursuits to the state elites relatively effectively. 
Accordingly, during this period, civil society and civil society organizations 
gained significance as necessary features for the promotion of democracy in 
Turkey (Heper and Keyman, 1998: 272). 
 
In Turkey, discussions on civil society during 1990s revolved around 
notion‘s relationship with other concepts like citizenship, secularism, liberal 
economic policies, voluntarism, consensus vs. conflict, and ethnicity and 
democratic maturation. Authors like Keyman and İçduygu (1998), focused on 
the formulation of citizenship in the Turkish context and underlined its 
characteristics as a product of the Kemalist modernization project. According 
to Keyman and İçduygu, for example, the western modernization project 
transformed the ―individual‖ to ―citizen‖ by basing the project on the philosophy 
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of rights. During the republican reforms in Turkey on the other hand, state 
handled the responsibility of transformation of individual and instead of 
organizing the societal relations according to the philosophy of rights; rather it 
preferred to define the societal relations in an alternative way (Keyman and 
İçduygu, 1998: 172-174). Since the Kemalist reforms foresaw a) a societal 
model based on homogeneity and uniformity and b) a citizenship model based 
on duties rather than rights, the citizen as a subject of political inquiry evolved 
in a different way. Hence this approach highlights the defective character of 
citizenship in Turkey by referring to the concretion of the citizen with the state. 
Since democracy and democratic amelioration necessitates autonomous 
individuals organized under civil societal organizations, this situation affected 
the development of civil society in Turkey in a deprecating way.  
 
 Nevertheless authors like Nilüfer Göle portray a peremptory framework 
about consolidation of democracy in Turkey. Göle thinks that democracy has 
already been consolidated in Turkey since Turkish public has internalized 
democracy as a norm of political behaviour (Göle, 1997: 47). As a result of the 
liberal economic policies, with the contribution of private mass media issues 
like secularism, religious and ethnic identity and alike gained priorities within 
public debates (Göle, 1997: 47). According to Göle civil societal movements 
during 1990s may be understood under the categorizations of liberal, Muslim 
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and leftist movements. First, with the help of liberal market oriented economic 
policies, a space has been created which is relatively independent from the 
state which is suitable for the inauguration of civil society. Second as a result 
of cultural politics of post 1980s, Islamist movements found the opportunity to 
organize and vocalize common demands of their participants‘ against state 
policies. And third as the leftist category Göle underlies the issue oriented civil 
societal groups that represent different identities within the civil society (Göle, 
1994: 222).  
 
 As Göle, Robins also italicizes the development of civil society during 
1980s and 1990s in Turkey. Robbins (1996: 74) explains this boost with giving 
reference to both internal and external factors. While author counts the 
globalization of market economy, media and communications among the 
external factors, he interlineates the restructuring of Turkish economy 
according to neo-liberal principles as an internal factor. These developments 
alleviated the established cultural and political identity and created additional 
space for the furtherance of civil society (Robbins, 1996: 74). Additionally the 
expanding appeals of different religious groups and ethnic differences found 
place both in political and public agenda. These developments sharpened the 
social and cultural divisions among the society and difference became more 
visible (Başkan, 1998: 235). 
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 The post 1980 era anatomized in an alternative way by a number of 
scholars. For example Navaro-Yasin (1998: 59) argues that the above-
described developments took place only at the discourse level. According to 
Navaro-Yasin, after 1980 coup there was a need for a ―space‖ which should 
―demonstrate‖ independent features from the state and accordingly state 
―discovered‖ the idea of civil society (Navaro-Yasin, 1998: 60). By this way, 
state managed to produce and reproduce the official ideology outside of its 
own boundaries. Unquestionably, organizations that are concerned only with 
the fabrication of official ideology of state, might have limited chance for the 
development of democracy.  
 
Sarıbay explains the expanded interest in civil society in Turkey with a 
rising demand for the establishment of western institutions for the sake of 
protection of the individual against state. Thus, civil society as one of these 
western institutions was perceived as a magic tool for democratization by 
every political formulation. Sarıbay argues that this situation resulted in a new 
political attitude in Turkey that may be called as ―civil societism‖ since the 
notion was practised without giving priority to the social and/or political reality 
depicted by it (Sarıbay, 1998: 96). The lip service paid to the civil society was 
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not helpful at all for creating values like democracy, tolerance etc. under the 
dominance of Islamic social structures and/or dominant political ideologies 
(Sarıbay, 2001: 143). 
 
 Ersin Kalaycıoğlu elaborates another dimension of the subject in 
question and elaborates the ―quality‖ of civil society organizations in Turkey. 
According to Kalaycıoğlu (1998: 121) since traditional orientations and 
unwritten practices became dominant during the post 1980 period, religious 
organizations like tarikats were accepted and diffused on a wider scale. Author 
labels this structure as ―neopatrimonalism‖ which is a new form of 
patrimonialism, referring to a situation where strong primordial values triumphs 
over modern political structures with a strong state and weak civil society 
(Kalaycıoğlu, 1998: 122). Furthermore Kalaycıoğlu refers to the rate of 
memberships to associations in Turkey and states that the 10 percent rate in 
Turkey is well under the levels of developed countries (Kalaycıoğlu, 1998: 
127). Author concludes his arguments by referring to the problems related to 
the existence of independent judiciary and neo-patrimonial political culture that 
hinders the development of strong civil society (Kalaycıoğlu, 1998: 133). 
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 Jenny White‘s contribution to the discussions of civil society puts 
another dimension to the problematic. She argues that the current civil societal 
structures in Turkey bases themselves son mutual trust and interpersonal 
obligation rather than on individualistic contractual memberships (White, 1996: 
143). Author refers to the difficulty of explaining non-western societies by the 
western terminology and tries to identify the similarities and differences of civil 
society in Turkey with its western counterparts (White, 2002: 261-272). 
 From the expostulations above one may conclude that the formation of 
civil society in the Turkish context initiated on incongruous grounds resulting 
from both political and social systems. Nonetheless, this situation started to 
evolve intermittently especially with the modernization movement that took 
place in the late Ottoman and early republican period. The augmentation 
related to civil society continued and accelerated especially during the last two 
decades and the role of civil society as a contributor to democratic maturity 
became macroscopic.  
  
In this chapter I have tried to carry out a theoretical discussion related 
to civil society and democratic consolidation. The first and second sections of 
this chapter provided the conceptual and theoretical discussions of the terms 
civil society and democratic consolidation respectively with a reference to their 
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relationship. The third section tried to portray the historical background and 
current situation of civil society in Turkey. In the following part of the 
dissertation I will put forward a model for analysing the relationship between 
civil society and democratic consolidation and apply this model in the Turkish 
context. This model will be framed by both theoretical discussions and 
historical background presented in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER III  
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
This chapter will put forward a model for the analysis of civil society and 
democratic consolidation relationship. To that end, first I will put forward the 
dimensions of civil society and democratic consolidation relationship and 
present a framework that will open up the possibility of an empirical analysis 
for the issue in question. Then I will provide information on the 
operationalization of my model including sampling and data analysis tools. 
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3.1. Dimensions of Democratic Consolidation and Civil Society 
Relationship 
As mentioned in the previous chapter this thesis understands 
democratic consolidation as a process and recognizes civil society as one of 
the main crafters of this process. On the event that a democracy turns into a 
sole electoral regime, there will be problems of acquiring legitimacy at mass 
levels. Democracy should be understood as a tool for adjusting power 
relations in a way to maximise the chances of citizens to manipulate the 
environment in which they live, and to contribute in and influence debates 
about the vital decisions that shape their society. The contribution of citizens to 
the democratic system through representative organizations can contribute to 
the consolidation in the following ways: a) by pressuring the decisions of 
representatives b) by conveying the policies of governments to the public c) by 
acting as a counterpart to the government both as an information source and 
implementer. In the following part I will present the approach for evaluating the 
democratic consolidation functions of civil society that will be utilized within this 
study. It will be a different classification that recommends a simple model, 
providing bases for an empirical research. 
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This thesis will frame the relationship between democratic consolidation 
and civil society within four major dimensions: formational, legal, value-based, 
and impact-related (Anheier et. al., 2001). All of these four dimensions are 
divided into sub-dimensions that search for their relevance with democratic 
consolidation.  
 
3.1.1 Formational Dimension 
 A civil society that is contributive to democratic consolidation is 
expected to have many strong, and varied civil society organizations that 
command various resources. The numbers of the civil society organizations 
may be an appropriate starting point for our purposes since it will reflect, in 
one way or another, the quality of the associational life. As the number of 
associations in civil society increases, it is more likely that these organizations 
will develop diverse purposes and agendas that will find reflections in the 
society. Moreover, the membership structure to these organizations may also 
reveal important facts. That is to say, on the conditions of lack of qualities of 
mutual trust, assurance and collaboration in a given society  the greater the 
membership to civil society organizations are expected refer to the wider the 
range of social involvement and activities that will find organized base. 
Through membership to the civil society organizations citizens may develop 
their qualities of trust, confidence and cooperation. These democratic qualities 
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are expected to reappear and settle in the political culture of the society. 
Additionally multiple memberships to the civil society organizations may help 
citizens to understand and evaluate the cross-cutting patterns of interests. 
 
 The vertical depth of civil society organizations seems to be another 
important point. What is meant by vertical depth is the extent to which civil 
society organizations are able to establish local branches that quest for their 
organization‘s goal at the lower levels of public life. This situation not only 
contributes to the membership, but also active participation of these members. 
Such kind of a setup will bring the members in a face-to-face relationship that 
will contribute to the elaboration of their current issues.  
 
3.1.2 Legal Dimension 
Democratic consolidation trough civil society necessitates a legal 
environment that enables citizen participation for the representation of their 
collective interests. There is often a need for clear and coherent regulations, 
which support civil society organizations and do not create obstacles to their 
freedom or unduly burden their operations. The laws must not only protect the 
freedoms of expression, association, and peaceful assembly of individuals, but 
also the exercise of these freedoms through the formation of legal entities 
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such as civil society organizations. Beyond guaranteeing the existence of civil 
society organizations, the laws ensure that they are governed with the 
principles of accountability and responsibility, and that they adhere to 
professional codes of conduct and self-regulation.  
 
 Autonomy of the civil society organizations appears as an important 
factor within this dimension. What is meant by autonomy is the absence of 
dominance of higher organizations, especially of the state. To the extent that 
the purpose of the civil society organizations are controlled and rerouted to 
according to the interests of a higher organization like state, it is expected that 
civil society‘s ability in crafting democracy will be undermined. To avoid the 
danger of too many regulations that make engagement in civic activity difficult 
and burdensome, civil society organizations must be encouraged to operate 
with self-regulation.  
 
 The political landscape that the civil society operates in is highly 
influential in its abilities of consolidation. A civil society that is contributive to 
democratic consolidation should have supportive legal, political and socio-
cultural environments.  
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3.1.3 Value dimension 
 An important key for understanding our problematic is highly dependent 
upon an analysis on the production of democratic values within and among the 
civil society organizations. As a part of citizen activity, participation in civil 
societal organizations fortifies social bonds, flourishes sympathy to the others 
and raises consciousness about democratic system. The more often that 
actors have the opportunity to develop the organisational and political capacity 
to advance their goals, protect their interests, and preserve their values in the 
democratic institutional environment, the more secure their commitment will be 
to that environment (O‘Donnell, 1992).  
 
 However, it would be naïve to presume that every civil societal 
organization has internal democratic structures, which open ways to 
democratic deliberation. Although, it is not easy to determine the internal 
democracy levels of civil society organizations still it is crucial to consider the 
degree of democracy within civil society organizations to evade tautological 
reasoning. To understand the issue in question, an elaboration on the 
institutional arrangements may be rewarding. Elected leadership based on 
free and uncorrupted elections, the rules that guarantee the freedom of 
expression within the organization and alike are crucial factors that an 
organization should have. However, one may still doubt about the internal 
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democracy level of a particular organization with above-mentioned 
characteristics since many organizations display these formal structures in a 
combination with authoritarian setting. Civil society organizations with strong 
central leadership cadres that are based patron-client tradition may be 
effective in fulfilling the short term aims like reaching governmental resources 
and alike but it may end up with the subjugation of the dissenting members‘ 
opinions. If the organizations‘ agenda is usually dominated by one person or a 
cadre, by and large there is no room left for the different ideas of the 
members. Eventually, a structure of such kind will not be contributive to the 
democratization processes. Furthermore, inter-organizational relations 
constitute another important dimension for the democracy building potential of 
civil society organizations.  
 
 Although some civil society organizations display domesticated 
democratic practices internally, they may not have same attitudes against 
other civil society organizations. Inevitably, if we expect any kind of democratic 
contribution from civil society, the goals and the methods of its organizations 
should not be totalizing or aiming to seize power over other organizations 
(Diamond, 1999: 228). 
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3.1.4. Impact Dimension 
Civil society organizations can play a part in democratic consolidation 
by contributing to the social political and economic programs by trying to raise 
the topics that are salient to them. Through vocalizing the problems and 
needs, civil society organizations can produce warnings for the elected 
officials and pinpoint the problems related to democratic shortages. Hence, by 
sensing these democratic shortfalls and trying to stipulate changes, civil 
society can contribute to political institutionalization. As Boussard points out 
―civil society as an agenda setter can also have implications for the 
performance or efficiency of the democratic regime, which is central to a 
widespread legitimacy among the population‖ (Boussard, 2003: 103). 
Moreover, it would not be wrong to suggest that agenda setting is not only 
limited to matters related to the political sphere, but also touches upon the 
issues like projects for the general welfare of the citizens. On the occasions 
when the governing elites do not take action for solving problems related to 
the democratic deficits, civil society appears to be the only tool for identifying 
these problems. Civil society by intercommunicating through mass medium or 
by directly drawing attention of the elected officials by utilizing different tools 
like campaigns may elevate and pinpoint the issues of democracy into the 
political agenda. By this agenda setting function on the areas like public 
administration reforms or human rights issues that political parties and 
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politicians seem reluctant to act upon, civil society may fill the gap and put up 
the issues in the public circles.  
 
The impact of civil society may be observed via its collaborative 
interchange with the governments and its policies. Civil society may involve in 
mutual assignments in which civil society organizations pool resources with 
governmental bodies, or some form of partnership. Hence as a counterpart, 
civil society can supply trust to political society by acting as a consultative 
body and by cooperating with state agencies for a competent policy 
performance. It is worth to mention that when the developmental work is 
concerned, civil society has a comparative advantage over state agencies. By 
being out of the scope of state bureaucracy, civil society organizations 
commonly, function in a more efficient and effective manner. Since they are 
often tightly connected individual‘s daily life, they are not only sensitive to 
emerging problems but also have the capability to indicate the concerns of 
individuals instantly which states at best can do indirectly (Warren, 2001: 78). 
Accordingly, by providing policy suggestions and cooperation to the state 
agencies for an efficient implementation, civil society and government 
cooperation could increase regime performance, which will eventually 
contribute to the bolstering of the regime legitimacy.  
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 Another impact area of civil society is related to accountability. 
According to O‘Donnell there are two forms of accountability: vertical and 
horizontal (1999, 38). Vertical accountability mainly refers to the relations 
between the government and citizens where the accountability is established 
trough elections. When horizontal accountability is concerned Schmitter 
includes civil society as a main actor and defines it as: 
 
―…the existence of permanently constituted, mutually 
recognised collective actors at multiple levels of aggregation 
within a polity that has equivalent capacities to monitor each 
other‘s behaviour and to react to each other‘s initiatives. 
These countervailing powers can be constituted of different 
mixes of public and private organisations. Their internal 
composition would be based on the participation of citizenship 
that is on the equality of rights and obligations of their 
respective members.‖ (1999, 61). 
 
Hence, according to this definition, even under the conditions of vertical 
accountability, civil society acts as agent that monitors the state activities. 
Thus in normative terms, civil society is expected to contribute to the 
consolidation process.  
Hypothesises, key questions and sub-dimensions related to the major 
dimensions are provided in Table 1. 
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TABLE 1 DIMENSIONS AND SUB-DIMENSIONS OF DC-CS-R AND 
DC-CS-A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FORMATIONAL DIMENSION 
Hypothesis: A civil society that is 
contributive to democratic consolidation 
has many strong, and varied civil society 
organizations that command various 
resources. (Walzer, 1992; Cohen and 
Arato, 1994; Diamond, 1994) 
Key Question: How large is civil society 
organizations in terms of membership, 
institutions, and networks; what is the 
level of sector concentration and which 
resources do they command? 
Formational Sub-dimensions  
F1 - Membership structure 
F2 - Sector diversity  
F3 - Citizen participation 
F4 - Funding 
 
VALUE DIMENSION 
 
Hypothesis: A civil society that is 
contributive to democratic consolidation 
has values that support democracy and 
sustain liberal values. (White, 1994; 
Norton, 1995; Diamond, 1999 ) 
Key Question: Which values inspire the 
civil society; what sort of norms and 
practices does it represent and transmit; 
how inclusive and exclusive are they; and 
what is the level of tolerance to other civil 
society groups? 
Value-based Sub-dimensions  
V1 - Establishing Democratic Values 
V2 - Internal Democracy  
V3 - Exclusiveness vs. Inclusiveness 
V4 - Transparency 
 
LEGAL DIMENSION 
Hypothesis: A civil society that is 
contributive to democratic consolidation 
has supportive legal environment. (Linz 
and Stepan, 1996; Özbudun, 2003; 
Anheier, 2001) 
Key Question: What is the legal and 
political space within the larger 
regulatory environment in which civil 
society operates; and what laws and 
policies enable or inhibit its 
development?  
Legal Sub-dimensions  
L1 - Operational Environment 
L2 - Threats and Opportunities 
L3 - Political Context 
L4 - International Dimension 
 
IMPACT DIMENSION 
Hypothesis: A civil society that is 
contributive to democratic consolidation 
works as a counterpart to the state by 
formulating policies for social, economic 
and political problems and monitor the 
implementations of these policies. (Cohen 
and Arato, 1994; Diamond, 1999; 
Boussard, 2003 ) 
Key Question: What is the contribution 
of civil society to specific social, 
economic and political problems? 
Impact related Sub-dimensions  
I1 – Impingement 
I2 – Responding Social Interests 
I3 – Counterpart 
I4 – Empowering Citizens   
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 Throughout this study the classification of the civil societal organizations 
will be made on two basic headings: the ―activity areas‖ and the ―scope‖ of the 
organizations. Former is related to the interests of the organizations. Civil 
society covers a great number of organizations with different characters both 
formal and informal. Although there are different categorizations for civil 
societal organizations within the academic literature (Diamond, 1994: 6) I will 
utilize a tripartite categorization of a) interest based organizations b) cultural 
organizations and c) topic oriented organizations. Among the first group I will 
include the organizations that look for the betterment of common material or 
functional interest of their members like workers, employers, commercial 
associations and alike. The second group will cover the organizations that 
advocate the common cultural rights and/or values, religious faiths beliefs and 
symbols. Finally the third category will include the organizations that work for 
the improvement of quality of life of a peculiar group (women, consumers etc.) 
or community as a whole on special topics (environment, human rights, 
election monitoring etc.). The latter is related to the organizational scope of the 
associations. Basically organizations in Turkey organized at local and/or 
national level. This bipartite categorization seems appropriate for the Turkish 
context since more than 95 percent of civil societal organizations in Turkey 
mentioned within the will fits under this categorization (TTV, 2005: 643-678). 
 
 75 
 
3.2. Operationalization and Sampling  
 
3.2.1. Operationalization  
 The system I propose here is called as democratic consolidation- civil 
society rectangle and democratic consolidation- civil society area (DC-CS-R / 
DC-CS-A). DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A is a model that was inspired by The Civil 
Society Diamond that was developed by CIVICUS and Helmut Anheier (2001), 
which presents the overall findings of a ―Civil Society Index‖ study in form of a 
diamond-shaped graph. However DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A, with its statistical 
accuracy, is a more advanced version of this tool with a different focus. It is a 
measurement system for presenting and analyzing the major contours of civil 
society in relation with democratic consolidation. The basic aim of the DC-CS-
R / DC-CS-A is to evaluate the democratic consolidation and civil society 
relationship in a systematic and visual way. In order to fulfil the above 
mentioned task the DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A system is set to: 
 
 Describe the state of civil society along a number of core characteristics 
and major dimensions  
 Serve as an assessment and a visual tool  
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 To set a systematic analysis that is empirically grounded, conceptually-
informed and relevant for policy purposes and  
 Be useful for national, regional and local level applications as well as 
comparisons.  
 
 The DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A faces nonetheless several challenges. There 
are major conceptual and methodological issues involved in developing a 
measurement and assessment system applicable across countries that differ 
in terms of culture, economy and politics. Such issues include questions like: 
―what is meant by civil society, what characteristics are significant for 
measurement purposes, and how should relevant data be presented and 
analysed?‖ What is more, there are significant technical challenges in terms of 
data coverage and availability. Many of the data items needed for the DC-CS-
R / DC-CS-A are not readily available at the levels of quantity and quality 
needed. Yet while the task may face serious obstacles at first, there can also 
be little doubt that systematic information and reporting system on civil society 
is very much needed. 
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 The DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A system rests on two basic assumptions. The 
first of them is that civil society is an evolving system, where separate 
dimensions can develop their own dynamics that frequently produce new 
outcomes. Second is that the concept of civil society is open to multi 
dimensional analysis that displays different orientations and variations over 
time. Accordingly, the outcome of a DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A analysis does not 
produce uni-dimensional explanations of civil society, like the ones based on 
only economic or legal aspects. Moreover it comes with a set of criteria that 
constitute a base for comparison among organizations, regions etc. Basically, 
the DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A aim to establish basic qualities of easy usage and 
interpretation.  
 
 As explained this study will focus on this relationship in four different 
dimensions. These dimensions function in three different levels of units of 
analysis: a) Comprehensive level b) Intermediate level c) Micro Level.  At the 
comprehensive level DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A may be applied to countries, 
societies or regions that may set opportunities for comparative studies. At the 
intermediate level, the unit of analysis is no longer civil society itself as it is in 
comprehensive level but a particular segment or sub-field of it like human 
rights or community development. Within this level DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A would 
deal with institutions, organisations and individuals of special relevance to the 
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field of democratic consolidation. Finally, at the micro-level the DC-CS-R / DC-
CS-A applies to one organisation or one specific setting primarily. Here, for 
example, we find the opportunity to focus on one civil society organization in 
any specific area like human rights and compare it other human rights 
organisations in the context of the larger civil society and the parameters of 
human rights policies in the area in which it operates. 
 
 The distinction between these units of analysis is important because 
each level necessitates different types of indicators. This study, because of its 
limitations, will operate in the micro and intermediate level. For all different 
DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A applications indicators should be in the same level of 
analysis. Table 2 represents the relationship between different levels and 
indicators. 
TABLE 2 LEVELS OF ANALYSIS AND INDICATORS 
 
 
 
 
 
Level: Comprehensive Indicators: Aggragete data 
Reference: Countries, regions etc. 
Level: Intermediate Indicators: Organizational data 
Reference: Operation fields like human rights. 
 Level: Micro Indicators: Data based on single unit 
Reference: Individual case studies 
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 In accordance with the framework described above, a number of sub-
dimensions were set to portray the dimensions. To start with as the sub-
dimensions for the formational dimension a) membership structure, b) sector 
diversity c) citizen participation and d) funding were selected. Secondly for the 
legal dimension a) operational environment, b) threats and opportunities, c) 
political context and d) international dimension were addressed as sub-
dimensions. The value dimension were analysed with a) establishing 
democratic values, b) internal democracy, c) exclusiveness vs. inclusiveness 
and d) transparency sub-dimensions. Fourthly and finally for the impact 
dimension, the sub-dimensions of a) impingement b) responding social 
interests c) acting as counterpart and d) empowering citizens were arranged. 
All of these sub-dimensions were transferred in to indicators in the form of 
questions and located in the DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A questionnaire. 
 
  
DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A questionnaire consists of 49 questions. The 
respondents were expected to express degree of their agreement with the 
statement shown by the indicator by giving a score from 1 to 7, with the lowest 
being an expression that you do not agree at all with the statement. The 
intermediary scores between 1 and 7 will then represent alternative options 
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between these two polar positions. Questions 1 to 13 are related to 
formational dimension, where 14 to 29 were set to investigate the legal 
dimension. Similarly questions between 30 and 39 were arranged to examine 
the value dimension and questions between 40 and 49 examines the impact 
dimension. DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A questionnaire can be found in Appendix A. 
 
The scoring was calculated for DC-CS-R at the indicator level by adding 
the individual scores for each indicator and then dividing the sum by the 
number of respondents. Secondly adding up the individual indicator scores 
and dividing the sum by the number of indicators will calculate the sub-
dimension score. Finally adding up the scores of the sub-dimensions and 
dividing by the number of sub-dimensions provided the dimension score.  
 
The DC-CS-R merges these different measures under one diagram and 
presents it visually.  DC-CS-R figures exemplify the relationship between civil 
society and democratic consolidation in terms of four dimensions. Alternative 
figures can be produced at different levels of analysis like the national, 
regional etc with different units of analysis under the condition that the 
adequate data is available. 
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 One point to remember is that the DC-CS-R exercise does not provide 
statistical precision. the DC-CS-R is an exercise in perceptions, and this 
technique is able to present approximations of people‘s thinking and 
perceptions in a way that is helpful and also productive. However in order to 
determine an exact numerical values out of the data this study will employ one 
last calculation. The areas of rectangles that will be calculated by utilizing 
standard deviations of indicators, sub dimensions and dimensions that will 
offer concrete figures. This will be called democratic consolidation-civil society 
area (DC-CS-A). All of the assumptions and levels of analysis that are valid for 
DC-CS-R is also valid for DC-CS-A. For calculating the DC-CS-A score every 
indicator‘s score will be divided by the standard deviation value of the research 
databese. Afterwards, these scores of indicators will be added up and divided 
by the number of indicators in a sub-dimension which will provide the sub 
dimension score for DC-CS-A. Similarly the sub-dimension scores of DC-CS-A 
will be added up and divided by the number of sub-dimensions for the 
dimension score of DC-CS-A. The area score will be calculated through the 
following method: scores of each level will be placed on the extensions of a 
plus chart as points. Then these points will be connected to each other to form 
a quadrangle. The area of this quadrangle will provide the DC-CS-A score. 
Trough this method this study will not offer only visual representations of the 
 82 
 
values through DC-CS-R but also solid numerical values for further 
comparisons. 
 
All of the civil society organizations that operate in Turkey were taken 
as the main population of this study. The preference of civil society 
organizations as respondents to the DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A questionnaire 
depends on a number of reasons. Firstly the issue in question is a highly 
specialised one and only the citizens who have ties with civil society 
organizations may respond to the DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A questionnaire in a 
comprehensive way. Secondly, the perceptions of civil society volunteers as 
the agents of policies created by these organizations will provide the accurate 
information about the democratization capabilities of those policies. Finally, 
other societal groups like bureaucrats, politicians etc. who might have interest 
in this research, have to be kept out of the population due to the time and 
funding limitations. Accordingly with the available resources to the researcher 
the civil society organizations constituted the most appropriate population for 
the field work of this study. 
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3.2.2. Sampling and Field Work 
  
The Directory for Civil Society Organizations (Türk Tarih Vakfı, 2005; 
―directory‖ herein after) the civil society organizations in Turkey were grouped 
according to their a) organizational structures (foundations, associations etc.) 
and b) activity areas (topic oriented, interest representation etc.) c) 
geographical locations and d) scope of activities (national, local, regional etc.). 
This classification displayed similarity with the classification on civil society 
organizations that were set for this study. During the field work of this study I 
aimed to reach around 450-500 respondents. A sample of 553 was chosen 
according to the stratified random sampling method for the database. By 
utilizing this sampling method this study tried to reach all types of the civil 
societal groups that are active in society. Accordingly, the sample included 
different civil societal organizations that display different characteristics. 
 
The field work of this study was carried basically on the Internet. The 
notice and questionnaires were sent to the respondents firstly via e-mail. The 
DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A questionnaire was also put on a web-page on the 
Internet. The non-responding civil society organizations in the sample were 
reached by alternative e-mails or telephone where necessary. Due to time 
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limitations of the study field work was planned to be conducted within 90 days. 
After 90 days, 213 responses were collected in the database. This refers to a 
response rate around 45 percent. Although a higher response rate was 
planned (around 60 percent) for this study, the response rate acquired is well 
above the unacceptable rate of 30 percent (Mangione, 1995). 
 
 Table 3 illustrates the frequencies and percentages of the activity area 
of the civil society organizations included in the database. 
TABLE 3 ACTIVITY AREA OF ORGANIZATIONS 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
interest based 84 39.4 39.4 39.4 
cultural 20 9.4 9.4 48.8 
topic oriented 109 51.2 51.2 100.0 
Total 213 100.0 100.0   
 
From these figures it is understood that the topic oriented organizations 
encircled nearly half of the database, with the 64 percent. Topic oriented 
organizations were followed by interest based organizations and cultural 
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organizations in size, with the percentages of 39.4 and 9.4 percents 
respectively. All of these figures display similarities as shares in the original 
directory. Hence it would not be wrong to conclude that when organizational 
activity areas concerned the sample displayed similar characteristics with the 
population. 
As mentioned this study employed two different levels for the analysis 
of the scope of organizations: regional level and national level. Table 4 
displays the scope of the organizations that are present in the database. 
TABLE 4 SCOPE OF ACTIVITY OF ORGANIZATIONS 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
regional 
organizations 
72 33.8 33.8 33.8 
national 
organizations 
141 66.2 66.2 100.0 
Total 213 100.0 100.0   
As the numbers suggest the bulk of the database (66 percent) consists 
of organizations that operate on the national level. This share also seems 
appurtenant since the organizations that operate at the national level are 
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expected to, command various sources, involve in more activities and cover 
more citizens. With the share of 33 percent database also provided an 
important space for the regional level organizations. By this way this study 
expects to demonstrate similarities and differences related to our research 
question at the national and regional level if any. Similar to activity area of 
organizations, scope of the organizations in the sample displays collation with 
the original population.   
 
Table 5 indicates the numbers related to the activity and scope of civil 
society organizations sampled in the database.  
TABLE 5 ACTIVITY AREA AND SCOPE OF ACTIVITY OF SAMPLE’S 
CROSSTABULATION 
 regional organizations national organizations Total 
interest based 37 47 84 
cultural 9 11 20 
topic oriented 26 83 109 
Total 72 141 213 
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 According to Table 3 with 83 organizations the biggest share in the 
database was taken by the organizations that are topic oriented and operate 
on national level. The least share nine organizations belong to cultural 
organizations that function on the local level. When the numbers and shares of 
other organizations in between concerned the sample seems to catch the 
diversity on both activity area and scope successfully. Eventually this 
distribution will help to conclude results in a more reliable way. Finally Figures 
1 and 2 displays the percentages of organizations compared with each other 
on the grounds of activity area and scope in the forms of graphics 
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FIGURE 2 PERCENTAGES OF ORGANIZATIONS WITH DIFFERENT 
ACTIVITY AREAS 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
 
This chapter will present a) findings of the field study of this thesis and 
b) evaluate these findings within the theoretical and empirical framework 
described in previous paragraphs. Following paragraphs are designed to 
present the findings first at the comprehensive level (aggregate data for all 
organizations) and then at the intermediate level (data for different groups of 
organizations). By this way I will not only set an evaluation on general situation 
but also a generic base for the further analysis where necessary. During each 
of these evaluations I will regroup the findings of the field study according to 
the activity areas of civil society organizations and further breakdown the sub-
dimensions among these groupings for a more comprehensive analysis. But 
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before going into these analyses, I will provide a key for the interpretation of 
the results generated by the DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A tool. This key will be a guide 
for the interpretation of the numbers generated by the DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A 
method that will open up the chance for comprehensible analysis of the data.   
 
4.1. Key for the DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A tool 
As mentioned in the second chapter the DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A tool will 
be employed as the main empirical tool for the examination of data collected. 
The DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A method consists of two different ―plus shape‖ charts 
united in one single chart. In this combined chart the DC-CS-R chart rests on 
the left and DC-CS-A on the right.  
 
DC-CS-R presents the indicator/sub-dimension/dimension scores 
produced by the database as a quadrangle. The more the quadrangle 
stretches to the outer boundaries, it represents a more contributive 
environment of civil society to democratic consolidation. This is due to the 
structure of the likert scale employed in the DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A 
questionnaire: the score ―7‖ was given for the cases of most contributive 
situations. Similarly, a quadrangle that produces a perfect rectangle at the 
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value of ―4‖ on each extension of the plus the chart, represents a neutral 
position of civil society related to its abilities to the democratic consolidation.  
 
The DC-CS-A tool also produces a quadrangle but different from the 
DC-CS-R, it comes with an area score. Similar to the DC-CS-R, bigger 
quadrangles that produce higher values, represent more contributive 
possibilities of civil society to democratic consolidation. According to the 
calculations the score of 954.845 represents the neutral value for the DC-CS-
A. This value represents the neutral position of civil society related to 
democratic consolidation. That is to say the DC-CS-A values those are bigger 
than 954.845 labels the contributive abilities of civil society. The neutral figures 
of both DC-CS-R and DC-CS-A are presented in Figure 3. 
FIGURE 3 NEUTRAL VALUES OF DC-CS-R AND DC-CS-A 
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In Figure 5, the DC-CS-R located on the left produces a perfect 
rectangle with values of ―4‖ on each side of the chart that refers to the neutral 
position described above. The DC-CS-A on the right represents the neutral 
DC-CS-A value of 954.845 based on the calculation on DC-CS-R score.  
 
4.2. Findings and discussions at the comprehensive level  
This part of the chapter will evaluate the findings by presenting the 
general scores for dimensions and further breakdown of these scores 
according to activity areas of civil society organizations.  
Figure 4 presents the results of the DC-CS-A/DC-CS-R tool at the 
comprehensive level. 
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FIGURE 4 DC-CS-A/DC-CS-R TOOL RESULTS FOR 
COMPREHENSIVE LEVEL 
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4.2.1 Formational Dimension 
Hypothesis: A civil society that is contributive to democratic consolidation has 
many strong, and varied civil society organizations that command various 
resources. 
Key Question: How large is civil society organizations in terms of 
membership, institutions, and networks; what is the level of sector 
concentration and which resources do they command? 
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Formational Sub-dimensions  
F1 - Membership structure 
F2 - Sector diversity  
F3 - Citizen participation 
F4 - Funding 
The analysis on the formational architecture of civil society 
organizations will open up chances for understanding the scope of social 
involvement and activities. It is expected that through membership to different 
civil society organizations, citizens will have the chances to develop their 
values of trust and confidence. Additionally it also expected that those values 
will spill-over to the political sphere as well. As much as the membership to 
civil society organizations expand and diversify, it would be more helpful for 
citizens to comprehend and appraise the diverging forms of interests. 
 
 The organizational configurations of organizations may also reveal 
some important facts about the formational dimension of civil society and 
democratic consolidation relationship. For example the ability of organizations 
to machinate local offices that aims to realize the organizations‘ aspirations at 
the different levels of public life would constitute a positive aspect of this 
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relationship. By this way, members not only will have the opportunity to set a 
face to face interaction with other members but also compare their demands 
both at local and national levels.  
 
One good point to start for an investigation of contribution of civil 
society to the democratic consolidation may be an analysis on its formational 
features. As mentioned in the hypothesis a civil society that assists to 
democratic consolidation is presumed to have various powerful and diverse 
civil society organizations that command different resources.  
 
In accordance with the above frame work, our model examines the 
formational dimension with four sub-dimensions of a) membership structure, b) 
sector diversity, c) participation and d) funding. As seen in figure 6 these sub-
dimensions with the averages of 2.90 for membership structure, 3.21 for 
sector diversity, 2.64 for participation and 2.25 for funding produced a 
relatively small quadrangle for DC-CS-R, with lower values then neutral ―4‖. 
These findings are summarized in Figure 4. 
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FIGURE 5 DC-CS-R/DC-CS-A SCORES FOR FORMATIONAL 
DIMENSION/OVERALL 
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Further examination on the indicators demonstrates that; 
a) more than 85 percent of the respondents think that the 
membership of citizens to civil society organizations is not 
adequate;  
b) 67 percent of the respondents think that civil society 
organizations in Turkey do not cover all sectors and groups 
effectively;  
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c) Around 90 percent of the respondents think that citizens do not 
participate in civil societal activities and; 
d) More than 91 percent of the respondents think that civil society 
organizations face serious funding problems 
When the low formational DC-CS-A score of 449.980 accompanied with 
above propositions it would not be wrong to argue that the formational 
dimension of civil society in Turkey seems to be weak and far from being 
contributive to the democratic consolidation. 
 
At this point, some assignations related to the effects of culture and 
tradition on the formation of civil society may be helpful for explaining these 
low scores, especially the sub-dimensions of membership structure and 
participation. According to Sarıbay (1997) the presence of a political culture 
that favours the absolute power of a political institution (i.e. state) restrains the 
establishment of multiple social institutions with different focus points.  The 
societies that compile and reproduce the docile behaviour patterns have 
tendencies to leave the resolutions of societal problems to that particular 
higher authority. Erkan (1995: 7-10) states that, a democratic society with a 
vibrant civil society should produce four basic cultural practices of social 
compromise, tolerance, political democracy and rationality which are missing 
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in the Turkish context. The evaluation of these values in the World Value 
Surveys ratifies the absence of above-mentioned values. According to these 
surveys (WVS: 1990; 1996 and 2001) more than 92 percent of respondents do 
not belong to any kind of voluntary organization or activity; 81 percent of the 
respondents think that people will take an advantage on each other if they find 
the opportunity; 60 percent of the respondents state that the democracies are 
indecisive and have too much quibbling and over 40 percent of the 
respondents did not count the values of ―tolerance‖ and ―respect to others‖ as 
values that need to be thought to children. Even these basic figures suggest 
that the political culture of Turkish society is not adequate for the formation of 
a vibrant civil society.  
  
 Elsewhere, the position of Turkish state against civil society was 
counted as an important obstacle for the formation of a vivid civil society (Akşit 
et.al., 2003: 85-90). The administrators of a number of topic oriented civil 
society organizations affirm that Turkish state by a) both defining and solving 
every problem in society, b) using psychological tools for preventing people to 
have organizations, c) closing itself to the contributions coming from civil 
society and finally d) not providing financial opportunities to civil society 
organizations, create barriers for the formation of civil society. 
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The low scores related to funding and sector diversity sub-dimensions 
may also be explained with the help of above paragraphs. According to the 66 
percent of respondents of DC-CS-R/DC-CS-A database, civil society 
organizations do not cover different groups of society like ethnic groups, 
women, workers etc. adequately. Additionally 67.1 of the respondents think 
that civil society organizations in Turkey are not organized effectively 
throughout the country.  According to the research done by History Foundation 
of Turkey (TTV) the major source of income of civil society organizations are 
subscription fees (TTV: 2003). Since the membership rates are low, 
consequently the funding of these organizations are being far from adequate 
levels.  
 
As the low scores of DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A and above analysis suggests 
the formational background of civil society organizations in Turkey is quite 
weak. It would not be wrong to argue that the formational structure of civil 
society in Turkey is rather determined by the existence of a strong state and a 
weak political culture that does not have enough accumulation of 
organizational ability (Akşit et.al., 2003: 306). 
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4.2.2 Legal Dimension 
 
Hypothesis: A civil society that is contributive to democratic consolidation has 
supportive legal environment. 
Key Question: What is the legal and political space within the larger 
regulatory environment in which civil society operates; and what laws and 
policies enable or inhibit its development? 
Legal Sub-dimensions  
L1 - Operational Environment 
L2 - Threats and Opportunities 
L3 - Political Context 
L4 - International Dimension 
 
A legal setting that accredits citizen participation for the realization of 
common interests is among one of the pre-conditions of a civil society that is 
expected to contribute to the democratic consolidation. The legal system 
should not only provide organized and reasoned codifications that comfort the 
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civil society organizations but also refrain from crafting mechanisms that curb 
their freedom or bar their operations. The laws that protect the freedoms of 
association, assembly of individuals and expression at the individual level, 
should also shield these rights at the organizational level. Beyond hedging the 
existence of civil society organizations, these laws should also certify that they 
are governed in accordance with accountability and responsibility.  
 
 The opportunities that are existent for the enhancement of self-
governing capacity of civil society organizations seem to be a relevant sub-
dimension of legal dimension. This capacity is highly related to the existence 
of other stronger power centres such as the state. To the point that the aim of 
civil societal organizations are guided by the interest of alternative power 
centres like state, it is not too hard to anticipate that the civil society‘s 
capability as a crafter of democracy will be damaged. The existence of 
innumerable rules and regulations will affect the magnitude of the civic activity 
and hinder the self regulation abilities of civil societal organizations.  
  
 In accordance with the above frame work this thesis analysed the legal 
dimension under four main headings, namely operational environment, 
opportunities, political environment and international dimension. As Figure 8 
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demonstrates the DC-CS-R scores are relatively higher than the formational 
level with values of 3.31 for operational environment, 3.69 for opportunities, 
3.27 for political context and 3.36 for international dimension. Figure 5 displays 
these DC-CS-R/DC-CS-A Scores for Legal Dimension. 
FIGURE 6 DC-CS-R/DC-CS-A SCORES FOR LEGAL 
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Furthermore, according to the indicators of legal dimension; 
 
a) More than 77 percent of the respondents think that, in practice, freedom 
of press is not established  in Turkey; 
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b) Around 60 percent of the respondents think that civil societal 
organizations cannot freely criticize governments; 
c) 72 percent of the respondents think that there are obstacles for the 
enjoyment of basic political rights in Turkey and 
d) Around 60 percent of the respondents think that the actions of 
international civil society organizations are hampered in Turkey. 
 
The DC-CS-A score for legal dimension was produced as 712.320. 
Although this is a higher value than the formational dimension score, it still 
under the neutral level of 954.845. So we may conclude as similar to the 
formational dimension, in overall terms, legal dimension also fells short in 
creating a potential for the democratic consolidation functions of a civil society. 
 
According to Özsunay (2000: 21) the legal framework for associational 
activity in Turkey displays a hybrid structure, trapped between authoritarian 
and democratic principles. Due to political and social fluctuations through the 
years the shape and content of this framework altered. Although the civil law 
no: 1926 foresaw a relatively democratic and liberal framework for 
associational activity, the law number 2512 issued in 1938, curbed the 
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previous law and altered the law according to a more authoritarian principles. 
After the end of world war two, in 1946 with the enactment of the law no: 4919, 
the legal framework for associational activity again rested on more liberal 
principles. This liberal framework reached to its peak with the additional 
support of 1961 constitution and the numbers of associations climbed from 
205 to 41.000 (Özsunay, 2000: 22). However after the 1971 military 
intervention with the legislation provided by law no: 1630 in 1972, the 
framework mutated to the authoritarian setting once again. The law number 
2908 which was passed after the 1980 coup lingers the provisions of the 
previous law and sustained the status quo related to the associational activity 
up to early 1990s. This law has been amended several times (1988, 1997, 
2000, 2002 and 2003) and replaced by the law no: 5253 in 2004.  
 
Up to late 1990s the legal framework for associational activity in Turkey 
displayed a number of other problems. To start with one may mention the 
technical issues related to this framework. The laws that govern the 
associational activity in Turkey rest both in the spheres of private and public 
laws. As a principle, issues related to the structure of organizations, decision 
on activities and alike are covered under the private law and the punishment 
codes for the activities of associations that agitate the public order are 
arranged under public law. In Turkey, the private law related to associational 
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activity is partly inserted under the provisions of Turkish civil law which creates 
uncertainty. Secondly, law foresees the existence of a) at least seven 
founders, b) five primary and five reserve members for executive committee 
and c) three primary and three reserve members for auditing committee for 
establishment of an association. Needless to say, these pleonastic 
reservations create extra obstacles in front of associational activity. Thirdly, 
the law lodges qualitative restrictions about the founders and members of 
associations. For example the associational activities of civil servants are 
extensively restricted as being members and/or founders. Fourthly, the law 
proposes a complex and difficult setup for the arrangement of international 
relations of associations. In most of the cases the international contacts of 
associations necessitates the approval of either Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and/or Ministry of External Affairs. Although the framework for associational 
activity tried to be altered a number of times, it won‘t be wrong to suggest that 
the legacy of barriers in front of the associational activity still loiters. 
 
 
The DC-CS-R scores are located around the value of ―3‖, which leaves 
limited room for being positive about the legal dimension. The highest DC-CS-
A score belongs to topic oriented organizations with 740.055, still below the 
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neutral score of 954.845. For legal dimension –different than the formational 
dimension- groups of organizations produced very similar scores to each 
other. Accordingly, I have an inclination to say that the legal arrangements do 
not discriminate among civil society organizations and provide same 
opportunities and/or obstacles for all. 
 
All of these items within the legal sphere create serious problems for 
the associational activity. These regulations may be assessed as practices 
that accord with the well-established suspicious reflex of Turkish state against 
associational activity. However this framework reproduces a system that 
hinders the possibilities of citizens to organize, with a high possibility to result 
in a passive and inactive civil society.  
 
The low DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A scores and above discussion 
demonstrates the state‘s willingness to control and direct civil society. This 
desire of Turkish state becomes crystal clear primarily among legal codes and 
practices. Although some steps were taken during the last years to ease the 
legal boundaries of associational life, the existent rules and regulations are still 
seems to be the proofs of the above-mentioned inclination of state. Needless 
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to say, the legal conditions directly have effect on the other dimensions 
especially the formational dimension. 
 
4.2.3 Value Dimension 
Hypothesis: A civil society that is contributive to democratic consolidation has 
values that support democracy and sustain liberal values. 
 
Key Question: Which values inspire the civil society; what sort of norms and 
practices does it represent and transmit; how inclusive and exclusive are they; 
and what is the level of tolerance to other civil society groups? 
 
Value-based Sub-dimensions  
V1 - Establishing Democratic Values 
 
V2 - Internal Democracy  
 
V3 - Exclusiveness vs. Inclusiveness 
 
V4 - Transparency 
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The production of democratic merits within and among civil society 
organizations constitutes an important part in our analysis. The participation of 
individuals in civil societal organizations energizes social affinities, amplifies 
commiseration to the other citizens and raises awareness about the deficits of 
democratic system. On the condition that citizens have the chances to 
organize themselves and realize their goals, it is expected that they will be 
committed to the democratic environment that provides the base for these 
activities. 
 
 Unequivocally, the civil society organizations do not produce democratic 
values and structures at all times and conditions.  It is decisive to judge the 
level of democracy within civil society organizations to avoid this tautological 
reasoning. For a democratic setting every civil societal organization should not 
only have elected leadership based on free and uncorrupted elections but also 
the rules those guarantee the freedom of expression within the organization. 
Even though the above-mentioned criterions are set these formal structures 
may still function in an authoritarian setting.    On the condition that the agenda 
of organizations is dictated by one person or a group there is no space left for 
the altered ideas of the members and the system may produce the condition of 
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the subjugation of the dissenting members‘ opinions. Eventually, a structure of 
such kind will not be contributive to the democratization processes. 
Additionally even if the civil society organizations exhibit established 
democratic practices internally, they may not have same outlook against other 
civil society organizations. Inevitably, if one anticipates any kind of democratic 
input from civil society organizations, the ambitions and the means of these 
organizations should not be in a totalizing manner. 
 
 This thesis evaluated the value dimension under four sub-dimensions of 
a) building democratic values; b) internal democracy; c) exclusiveness and d) 
transparency. As figure 6 demonstrates the DC-CS-R scores of value 
dimension are closer to the neutral value of 4 which differentiates this 
dimension from others. The sub-dimensions of internal democracy, 
exclusiveness and transparency produced DC-CS-R values that are higher 
than or closer to neutral level, where only the democratic values dimension 
produced the value of 3.19.  
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FIGURE 7 DC-CS-R/DC-CS-A SCORES FOR VALUE 
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 The further analysis on indicators revealed the fact that  
a) Around 21 percent of the respondents think that civil society 
organizations work for the establishment of democratic values at the 
societal level; 
b) Around 80 percent of the respondents think that the internal functioning 
of civil society organizations are not democratic but at the same time 67 
percent think that the executives of civil society organizations are 
elected through fair elections; 
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c) More than 40 percent of the respondents think that civil society 
organizations do not involve in gender discrimination within their 
functioning; and 
d) Around 55 percent of the respondents think that the civil society 
organizations in Turkey have transparent and accountable 
organizational structures. 
 
The value dimension produced the value of 896.350 for DC-CS-A tool. This 
is the highest score among other dimensions. Accordingly it should be noted 
that although the value dimension still stays below the desired levels of DC-
CS-R / DC-CS-A scores it has the best position over the other dimensions.  
 
Both Inglehart (1990: 37) and Fukuyama (1995: 10) considers the 
democratic values like trust and tolerance as crucial factors in prolonging 
cooperation and associability in a civic setting which in turn directly related to 
the establishment of a stable democracy. In a former research (Kalaycıoğlu, 
1995: 37) the levels of trust in Turkey was portrayed at low levels: around 90 
percent of people living in Turkey think that the fellow human beings are not 
trustworthy. This throughput seems consistent with the findings of the study 
since the DC-CS-R score related to the establishment of democratic values 
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sub-dimension was calculated as 3.19. This value descends to even lower 
than ―3‖ among cultural organizations. Another research that also focused on 
the values that are prominent among civil society organizations in Turkey 
revealed the fact that a) there is a tendency to ignore the ―others‖ (other civil 
society organizations, other individuals that have different issues to rise etc.) 
and exclusively focus on their own issues b) high levels of ―moralism‖ that 
produces the exclusion of different organizations of marginal groups and c) 
radicalization of their stances which leaves limited room for democratic values 
like trust and tolerance  (Kadıoğlu, 2005: 38-39). 
 
The civil society in Turkey displays a high level of diverse and 
fragmented structure. According to Akşit et. al (2003: 313) this situation is a 
result of a number of factors including the strong state tradition, the gap 
between centre and periphery and socio-political conditions of last two 
decades. This fragmentation is also visible among the civil society 
organizations. Although civil society organizations cooperate with each other 
on specific occasions, these attempts are far from constituting a stable 
institutional structures. Especially underlining the political differences among 
the civil society organizations hinders the blossoming the democratic values of 
trust and alike.  
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The problems related to the internal democracy of these organizations 
also produced  low scores in the DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A  analysis. The 86 
percent of respondents thinks that the internal functioning of civil society 
organizations are undemocratic. The members contribute to the decision 
making processes occasionally and this responsibility are mostly taken by the 
administrative boards. The existing hierarchical structures bars the possibilities 
of democratic participation and the reluctance of members help to the 
upholding this structure (Akşit et. al., 2003: 313). 
 
4.2.4. Impact Dimension 
Hypothesis: A civil society that is contributive to democratic consolidation 
works as a counterpart to the state and contributes to the solving of social, 
economic and political problems. 
Key Question: What is the contribution of civil society to specific social, 
economic and political problems? 
Impact related Sub-dimensions  
I1 – Impingement 
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I2 – Responding Social Interests 
 
I3 – Counterpart 
 
I4 – Empowering Citizens   
 
Civil society organizations can take an active role during the democratic 
consolidation process by committing solutions to the social and political 
programs. They can awaken the public by pointing out the axial issues and by 
verbalizing the problematic areas and requirements. Civil society organizations 
can effectuate warnings for the elected officials and diagnose the problems 
related to democratic shortages. Hence, by locating these democratic 
paucities and trying to stipulate changes, civil society can play an important 
role during the process of political institutionalization. Furthermore, these 
actions of civil society are not only limited to issues that take part in the 
political sphere. By means of these actions, civil society forces also comment 
on the issues like projects for the general welfare of the citizens. Where the 
governing elites do not respond to the problems related to democratic deficits, 
sometimes civil society organizations come forth as the main apparatus for 
spotting these problems. Civil society by utilizing the mass medium or by 
noticing the elected officials through different strategies like campaigns an 
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alike can lift the issues related to democracy into the political agenda. Hence, 
civil society forces by this way have the opportunity to fill the gap between 
elected officials and society and put up the issues in the public circles that 
political parties and politicians seem reluctant to act upon. 
  
 The civil society forces have the ability to establish collaborative 
interchange with the political society that enhances its impact capability. For 
example, civil society may involve in mutual assignments in which 
organizations pool resources with governmental bodies, or some form of 
partnership. Hence acting as a counterpart, civil society can bring in 
confidence to political society not only by acting as a counseling body but also 
by cooperating with state agencies for a proficient policy performance. 
Additionally, acting out of the scope of state bureaucracy, civil society 
organizations habitually, operate in a more efficient and effective manner 
when compared to state. Therefore, by supplying policy proposals and 
assistance to the state activity, civil society and government collaboration 
could increase regime performance.  
 
Civil society can also play a part in democratic development by 
providing education to the public and distribute information and facts about the 
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political system. As a result, the citizens who have limited knowledge about 
the democratic system can be informed and so that they can be aware of their 
rights and duties. For the same reason, citizens may bring together an 
understanding of trust in the democratic system with a permanent check on 
the performance of the ruling elite. In addition civil society as an educator can 
raise communal responsiveness, and thereby enhance the democratic 
proficiency among citizens. On the condition that the civil society organizations 
are democratically structured, democratic outlook and conduct can be built up 
by taking part within these organizations. Civil society may act as an important 
source of civic education for both the ruling elites and the public and open up 
the channels for dissemination of democratic values to the public. A significant 
number of civil society organizations in Turkey are involved in the project of 
educating the citizens concerning different aspects of the democratic system 
including the areas like women rights, consumer rights or directly the 
democratic rights and duties. Lately with the funds of European Union, these 
attempts are accelerated. 
  
Civil society has the potential to contribute to democratic development 
by creating original political choices. Without doubt, civil society movements 
have the potential of transforming themselves into political parties that seek 
power within the political sphere and thus could enrich representation and 
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amplify pluralism in society. By this way, civil society may act not only as a 
source of new political alternatives, but also as a pool of new leadership. Civil 
society as a source of pluralism can contribute to democratic development by 
generating new political alternatives and by supplying different perceptions 
that can improve representation and encourage discussions. 
This thesis analysed the impact dimension under the sub-dimensions of 
impingement, responding social interests, acting as counterpart and 
empowerment of citizens. As Figure 7 demonstrates the DC-CS-R scores are 
relatively higher than the formational and legal dimensions with the values of 
2.35 for impingement, 3.66 for responding social interests, 3.85 for acting as a 
counterpart and 4.08 for empowering citizens. 
FIGURE 8 DC-CS-R/DC-CS-A SCORES FOR IMPACT 
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 Furthermore, according to the indicators of impact dimension; 
a) 24 percent of the respondents think that civil society organizations are 
effective in monitoring and directing the policies of governments; 
b) Around 30 percent of respondents think that a considerable amount of 
citizens in Turkey have trust to the civil societal organizations; 
c) Around 30 percent of respondents think that civil societal organizations 
pressurize governments for solving the prioritized problems of society   
d) Nearly 50 percent of respondents think that civil society organizations 
are helpful for the generation of social capital.  
 
The impact dimension produced the value of 714.870 for DC-CS-A tool. 
This is the second highest score after the value dimension however it is under 
the neutral level of 954.845. So it would not be wrong to conclude that 
although the impact dimension seems inadequate in creating a potential for 
the democratic consolidation in general terms it has a better comparative 
position over the legal and formational dimensions.  
 
In overall relatively high DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A scores of impact 
dimension may be explained with a number of current developments. 
 119 
 
Especially with the current European Union agenda, civil society organizations 
in Turkey are pressing more than ever and try to set the agendas in a wide 
range of policies, which will expectantly contribute to a possible membership 
of Turkey to the European Union (Türk, 2002). An enthusiastic process of 
policy adaptation and harmonization started within Turkey when it was 
declared that Turkey was accepted as an official candidate for the European 
Union after the Helsinki Summit in December 1999. Among many important 
areas of this harmonization process, the issue of civil society seemed to be a 
vitally important one to the European Union bodies. The importance of this 
topic has been reflected in the Accession Partnership Document issued in 
2000, in which the European Union Commission identified its priorities, 
objectives and conditions for the full membership of Turkey. Accordingly, in 
2001 Turkish government launched the National Programme which states the 
aim of full protection of individual rights and freedoms, the freedom of thought 
and expression, the freedom of association and peaceful assembly and the 
enlargement of the space of civil society in Turkey in order to elevate the 
structure and quality of Turkish democracy to the level of the European 
standards. More than one hundred civil society organizations with the motor 
power provided by Economic Development Foundation (IKV) established a 
campaign for agenda setting, which tried to both direct and monitor the 
governmental activity on harmonization issues. This well-organized movement 
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contributed to the political determination for a possible full membership to the 
European Union and accordingly, pushed the governments to pass the 
necessary laws (Birand, 2002).  
 
 Civil society organizations also monitor the reforms in the areas of 
judiciary and public administration. Without doubt, one of the vital elements of 
a democratic system is an autonomous judiciary with well-established 
organizational capabilities. The judiciary in Turkey has always been criticized 
by civil societal organizations, especially by the bars, basically because of its 
lack of independence from the executive. During 1990s, with the help of 
European Union membership agenda, civil society in Turkey started to 
demand reform for the judicial system. Civil society organizations raised the 
issue to the political agenda with special reference to the conflicting nature of 
the current judicial system with the European Union norms. Among other 
things, civil society demanded reforms including the reorganization of the dual 
structure of judiciary (civil and military) and check of military courts by the 
higher civilian courts where necessary. Civil society organizations also play an 
active role in the public administration reform discussions. A wide range of civil 
society organizations including municipalities, employee associations, trade 
unions and alike, commented on the new reform draft and accentuate their 
demands about the new law (Güngör, 2003). These demands were also put 
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forward by the civil society organizations during the meetings of Economic 
Social Council, which is an auxiliary institution advising to the government 
(Haskebabcı, 2003).  
 
 One last example worth to mention is related to the area of human 
rights. In the area of human rights, civil society organizations increasingly 
become visible with the help of high media attention and publicity. The 
examples of such efforts appear repetitively in media. Although, it is very 
dubious that they have the same influence power as the groups mentioned 
above, they still vocalize their demands through communicating channels like 
private publications, demonstrations and the Internet. Accordingly, they are 
fulfilling the function of setting priorities and drawing attention to issues that 
traditionally ignored by ruling elites. In the Turkish case, one may argue that 
the issues like human rights are only phonated by civil society organizations 
and hence they remain as the sole base for representation and articulation of 
the opinions and demands coming from society.  
 
The disastrous earthquake happened in 1999 provides a suitable 
landscape for analyzing civil society‘s role as a government counterpart in 
Turkey. The quake hit the Marmara region of Turkey and more than 17,000 
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lives were lost. It also destroyed more than 100,000 houses and 16,000 
businesses, caused serious damage to the infrastructure including 
telecommunication networks, highways, industrial settings and alike. Just after 
the disaster, perhaps even faster than the state officials, civil society 
organizations reached to the region assisting survivors. As of 3 October in the 
province of Adapazari alone, there were 55 different groups (including private-
sector companies, NGOs both foreign and Turkish, foreign government aid 
providers and some run by the state agencies) that had set up tent cities 
(Jalali, 2002: 130). Some of the civil society organizations noticed the need for 
a better coordination and went one step further to form a group which consists 
of 40 organizations under the name of Civil Society Earthquake Coordination 
Committee to provide help in a more effective and efficient way. Under the 
coordination of this organization, civil societal groups managed to pool their 
resources jointly and provided services more effectively.  
 
 The efforts of Turkish Medical Association (TTB) and the Turkish 
Association of Architects and Civil Engineers (TMMOB) may constitute 
another example. They have noticed the incapability of governmental bodies in 
assisting activities and decided to form up another aid group. This aid group 
first, conducted a survey to assess the needs of victims with surgical precision 
and then each organization took responsibility for providing different services 
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(Dirican, 2003). While some of them were responsible of distributing goods to 
neighborhoods, others like TMMOB were responsible for assessing the 
destruction to infrastructure such as electricity and building damage (Jalali, 
2002: 131). Universities did also involve in aiding activity with their technical 
knowledge in areas like the inspection and reconstruction of damaged 
buildings and infrastructure. The earthquake disaster revealed the fact that, 
civil society can act as a powerful force in Turkey that can even handle 
hazardous situations of such magnitude. 
 
Although civil society organizations provide educational service in a number of 
different subjects, the area of human rights appears up to be the most popular 
one. Frequently civil society organizations stress the importance of human 
rights issues and the need for an increased awareness and knowledge in this 
area for ordinary citizens. An example campaign was launced in 2004 by the 
Association of Support for Contemporary Life (Cagdas Yasami Destekleme 
Dernegi, CYDD). Within this campaign, CYDD aims to provide basic 
knowledge on human rights and democracy to a population of 8000 citizens 
living in 6 different districts of Istanbul. They have reached 2000 citizens 
already, and provide essential information about citizen, patient, social and 
worker rights (Aktaş, 2005 ). A further example is the project carried by 
Kadikoy Municipality of Istanbul, under the name of Social Cooperation for 
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Democracy and Human Rights (Demokrasi ve İnsan Hakları İçin Toplumsal 
İşbirliği Projesi). This project is funded by both European Union and Kadikoy 
Municipality and started in 2003. The campaigners not only reached a 
considerable amount of citizens including unemployed and handicapped 
people but also representatives of civil society organizations who have 
branches in Kadikoy. The participants were educated by the experts in the 
areas of human and basic democratic rights (Yılmaz, 2005).  
 
 This information providing activity and training is not only limited to the 
ordinary citizens. Several organizations are engaged in the work of training 
and capacity building among civil servants. In the area of human rights, an 
interesting example is the effort of The Organization of Human Rights and 
Solidarity for the Oppressed People (MAZLUM-DER). Beyond its other 
activities, this organization also offers human right courses to the religious 
leaders (imam) (Milliyet, 2004). MAZLUM-DER was actually the first 
organization to train the religious officials in the area of human rights. Its vision 
is not only to defend freedom expression for all kind of politic views and 
thoughts, but also to promote respect for human rights among the different 
societal groups as well. Another example is the campaign held by Turkish 
Democracy Association (Turk Demokrasi Vakfi, TDV), which aimed to provide 
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basic human rights education to headman of villages in central Anatolia where 
the course took place in three different cities and reached to 40 headmen.  
 
 Besides human rights issues, civil society organizations provide 
education and training in other areas like social and economic rights. Typically, 
these activities involve production of information material and courses or 
seminars and the bulk of these projects have a special focus on the vulnerable 
groups or groups in an exposed situation. Projects aiming at educating women 
and to elevate the women‘s position in the society may be counted among 
examples. In a recent example 59 different civil society organizations pooled 
their resources in order to provide basic training for elevating women‘s position 
in society. According to their data they have reached 4000 women and 63 
percent of the women who took the course managed to eliminate violence 
against them completely and 22 percent reduced it in considerable amount.  
Additionally 30 percent of the attendants started to work to provide additional 
income to their household and 54 percent returned to school either to 
complete their education or to start a new one (Akçura, 2005).  
 
 As a conclusion two points seem to mention worthwhile. First of them is 
related with the visible popularity of the human rights issues among the civil 
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society organizations in Turkey. Regardless of their main focus of activities 
civil society organizations have a significant tendency to insert the human 
rights issues both into their agenda and activities. For example, a project 
carried by the Association for Homeless Children in Adana (Adana Sokak 
Çocukları Derneği), which has the aim of creating active work force out of 
young and homeless children, includes education in human rights as a part of 
this activity. The second one is related to the state civil society relations. The 
educational function of civil society refers to cooperation with state authorities. 
All of the examples provided above have a connection with a related state 
office either for informing purposes or as a cooperative body. Additionally 
Turkish state by itself also through utilizing its institutions aims to raise 
consciousness about human rights issues by providing education to its 
officers. For example The Provincial Human Rights Watch Boards, (Insan 
Haklari Il Izleme Kurullari) which set by the Ministry of Interior Affairs offered 
courses on democracy and human rights to not only the police and 
gendarmerie but also to a wide range of civil servants (Çolak, 2001).  
 
Another issue is the political activities of civil societal organizations. 
Although by definition political parties are excluded from our definition of civil 
society, the significant increase in the number of parties in Turkey is worth to 
mention at that point. Between the years of 1983 and 1999 the number of 
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parties, which compete in national elections, rose from three to twenty. It is 
quite dubious that any of these small political parties will turn out to be strong 
political actors in the near future. Yet, it would not be wrong to suggest that 
even the mere existence of new parties may open the channels of pluralism in 
political society. One common argument about traditional political parties in 
Turkey is their disability of transmitting the demands coming from the society. 
The existence of small parties endows the voters with at least a feeling that 
they can prefer a party that stands for them. In the end, by presenting different 
political options to the voters, these parties could also amplify the legitimacy of 
the democratic system as a whole. With the presence of alternatives, a 
generous political debate could be stimulated among the public circles. 
Furthermore, these kinds of movements, on the condition that they have their 
origins rooted in civil society, may viaduct the divide among the conventional 
political parties and civil society.  
 
 Mainly the new political parties emerged during the 1990s was an end 
result of the enduring economic crises of the times. The traditional political 
parties under this heavy economic turbulence, did not function as think tanks 
for processing new political or economic ideas or policies. Such kind of an 
absence for political opposition has helped to the establishment of a number of 
civil societal organizations, which aimed to fulfill this gap. During 1990s the 
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political opposition produced by civil societal organizations like New 
Democracy Movement (YDH) or The Limpid Movement (ARI) became more 
and more visible among the popular circles. Even though they have not 
succeeded in ending the dominance of the traditional parties, they managed to 
find space in media, improve representation, contribute to an increased 
pluralism in society and helped a healthy debate with alternatives. Additionally, 
they were referred as model organizations for traditional political parties on a 
number of occasions. For example during 1999 leadership elections of 
Peoples Republican Party (CHP), a number of candidates referred to YDH as 
a successful model for CHP for e establishment of linkages with civil society 
(Zaman, 1999). 
 
 Civil society may act as a rich resource for the establishment of 
democratic leadership on the condition that leaders have backgrounds in 
democratic civil societal practices. The conventional political parties and their 
non-democratic organizational structures that are often coupled with the 
corrupted economic and political elite do not constitute a suitable base for the 
establishment of such democratic leadership. As a result of that, new 
generations are neither visible and nor effective in the political parties in the 
Turkish context. Moreover the transformation from civil society to the political 
society is quite rare. With the exception of YDH, which started as a think tank 
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and later transformed itself to a political party, it is quite unlikely to see the 
repositioning of civil societal organizations into political society. Recently, 
however, this tendency started to change with a number of individual transfers 
from civil society to political society. Actors who took important places in civil 
society organizations began to acquire positions in political sphere. For 
example, the ARI movement that is active over a decade, recently, managed 
sending its members to the political parties and parliament (Yılmaz, 2001). 
However the movement itself neither supports a political party nor transfers 
itself to the political sphere. Rather they prefer to support individual candidates 
who have belief in the rule of law, transparency and democratic values 
(Köprülü, 2002).  
 
 One another point worth to mention is, interestingly, this relocation 
occurs not only from civil society to political society but also from political 
society to civil society. The politicians, who are out of the political sphere for 
any reason, search to establish the ways of integration into civil society.  
 
 In Turkey civil society as a source of new political alternatives, did not 
produce a significant reassignment of leadership from civil society to the 
political community. However with the emergence of new parties, and although 
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they have not confronted the continual supremacy of the conventional parties, 
it is expected that they will contribute to the possible pluralism channels in 
Turkish society. 
 
4.3 Findings and discussions at the intermediate level  
The following paragraphs will analyse the findings for some of the civil 
society organizations at the intermediate level. As mentioned before this study 
grouped the organizations under the headings of a) interest based 
organizations b) topic oriented organizations and c) cultural organizations. The 
investigation at the intermediate level will reveal the similarities and 
differences among different types and portray the chances of democratic 
consolidation abilities of these different groups of civil society organizations. 
 
4.3.1  Interest Based Organizations 
As mentioned earlier, this study covers the organizations that look for 
the betterment of common material or functional interest of their members 
under the category of interest based organizations. Hence this category 
includes not only the  workers and  businessmen associations but also other 
commercial organizations and alike.  
 131 
 
 
The DC-CS-R/DC-CS-A values for the economic interest based  
organizations are provided in figure 8. 
FIGURE 9 DC-CS-R/DC-CS-A SCORES FOR INTEREST BASED 
ORGANIZATIONS 
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 Figure 8 different than the previously displayed DC-CS-A charts, 
produced values below or around ―4‖. The highest value was produced by the 
value dimension with 4.09 and the lowest value belongs to the formational 
dimension with 2.95. For legal dimension and impact dimension DC-CS-A 
chart has the values of 3.56 and 3.71 respectively. The DC-CS-A score with 
the value of 715.860 stays under the neutral value of 954.845. The following 
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paragraphs will interpret the above mentioned values. While doing so I will 
refer to the historical background of these organizations and then, basically 
focus on voluntary interest based organizations and chambers. 
 
Interest based organizations deserves special attention as examples of 
civil societal organizations in the Ottoman-Turkish continuum. The Ottoman 
guilds appear as the earliest example in this tradition. The guilds were 
occupational establishments that tried to serve the economic interests of small 
and middle-sized entrepreneurs. There is a disagreement about whether the 
Ottoman guilds acted as an extended arm of the state or manage to stay 
autonomous (Tosun, 2001: 210-214). However, it would not be wrong to argue 
that as institutions of society they were utilized and directed by the Ottoman 
state as agents for economic and social control (Baer, 1980: 98). As 
professional institutions involving in economic activity guilds did not have the 
freedom neither to compete among themselves nor to determine the 
commercial practices like prices, profit rates etc. Additionally the approval of 
state officials on the administrators of guilds was necessary. The polity of 
Ottoman State that tries to control and direct every civil societal establishment 
leaves no room for adversary style of politics. When there was a need for the 
recognition and organization or the entrepreneurial activity by the 1850s state 
continued the above-mentioned tradition and tried to ascertain a close 
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command on these activities. As a result the state tried to manipulate the 
economic development via its centralized administrative system. As 
Mahçupyan writes (1994: 56) ―the state possessed the area of rights that 
should be opened up for citizens, as prerogatives for itself‖. Hence, the state 
during its modernization perpetuated the old tradition of the domination of 
state over society.  
 
After the elimination of guilds from the bureaucratic system, the interest 
based organizations emanated as mutated forms of guilds under the 
organizational structures as chambers. They were initiated by state and 
established by law with status of ―public institution‖ and responsible of fulfilling 
the duties of state where necessary. They were setup to work with the State‘s 
relevant offices to support trade and industry (Öncü, 1983: 1567-1570). 
Chambers had the monopoly on the occupational activity of all related 
professionals since membership to chambers were mandatory. This actual 
situation shaped the chambers as agents of state rather than the assignees of 
their members. This is due to the reason that this organizational structure was 
further utilized by young Turkish republic during the single party period. 
Although state‘s supervision on chambers was loosened during the multi-party 
period due to the relatively liberal policies, governments reaction to these new 
situation was that of altering the formal control mechanisms with informal ones 
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(Heper, 1991a: 15). The era after 1950 up to late 1960s was labeled with 
governments arbitrary and discriminative approaches to the chambers 
(Bianchi, 1984: 115) where the chambers‘ opinions only valued when they are 
fully compatible with government‘s policies. 
 
From the above discussion we may conclude that although the interest 
based organizations were introduced into the political system, it seems that 
the basic intention behind this introduction was not agglomerating the 
demands coming from society but to predominate them. According to Heper 
(1991a: 16-17) the voluntary interest based organizations followed the same 
route as chambers and did not produce ideas that challenge the status-quo.  
 
Basically the issues related to democracy appeared in the agenda of 
interest based organizations in Turkey during 1990s especially with the efforts 
of voluntary economic interest based organizations. Especially by the mid 
1990s, the referral to democracy and democratization became visible among 
the reports and periodicals of associations. The motive behind this interest in 
democracy was explained by referring to a need for an instrument for 
―generating greater legitimacy for these organizations and their activities 
through exercising their social responsibilities via the civil society‖ (Öniş and 
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Türem, 2001: 97). However their conception of democracy and degree of 
commitment to democracy display asymmetries. The Turkish Industrialists‘ 
and Businessmen‘s Association (TÜSİAD) became quite visible with their 
research activities and reports related to democratization. With a divergent 
approach than TÜSİAD, the Independent Industrialists‘ and Businessmen‘s 
Association (MÜSİAD), can be categorized as a second-ranking association in 
terms of raising democratic demands. The Union of Turkish Chambers and 
Stock Exchanges (TOBB) and Turkish Employers‘ Confederation (TİSK) seem 
to be less vocal forces than TÜSİAD or MÜSİAD in calling for a democratic 
opening (Öniş and Türem, 2001: 98). 
 
 
 Basically the rapid development of private entrepreneurship during 
1950s and 1960s opened up the way to the establishment of business 
associations. The fast-growing holdings with multi functions of the time 
decided to unite under the umbrella of TÜSİAD. TÜSİAD different then other 
business associations like TOBB displayed a selective style for the 
membership to the institution with high entrance fees and referencing system. 
Due to those reasons TÜSİAD still rest on the firms with relatively high 
business capacity which are mainly located in İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir. 
Additionally Vorhoff (2002: 317) states that the main success of these firms 
 136 
 
was mainly a result of the economic policies of early republic. This essential 
connection of TÜSİAD with the state shaped its mission and administration. 
The mission statement of the organization refers to the principles of Atatürk 
and his perspective of the modern Turkey based on secularism. This basic 
principle eventually necessitates the respect to the democratic rights of 
individual on the grounds of entrepreneurship, belief and thought. 
  
Besides its economic activities TÜSİAD also perceives itself as an 
institution which provides information and opens up the channels of debate on 
the important issues related to the current agenda of the country. Buğra 
explains this ―self-awarded‖ responsibility with the inability of Turkish state on 
establishing strong relationship with the private entrepreneurship and society 
(Buğra, 1994: 132). TÜSİAD with such kind of an activity tries to alter its 
position from an ―interest group‖ to a ―pressure group‖ where former refers to a 
group which self-interestedly seeks only for profit and latter refers to a civil 
societal organization that works for the well-being of society. Accordingly it 
becomes ―normal‖ to step up and pinpoint the socio-economic problems of the 
society. However, according to Vorhoff (2002: 321) this behavior also ―covers 
the real motive of profit behind the general aim of strengthening of the 
society‖. 
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 TÜSİAD, in principle, has an internal democratic structure where its 
internal bodies of administration are elected by its members. Decisions are 
taken by the board of directors with the help of board of advisories. The 
commissions, where the basic policies and projects of organization are set, 
are open to all members (Gülfidan, 1993: 52-53).  
 
 
It would not be wrong to argue that TÜSİAD starting from its early years 
of establishment aimed to limit its activities within the economic sphere and 
refrained from involving in politics. However, the organization displayed a 
noteworthy change of stance in the context of the 1990s. TÜSİAD circulated a 
series of reports that focused on the inherent dearth of the democratic system 
and to offer ways of mastering these insufficiencies and, consequently, extend 
the boundaries of democratic politics in Turkey. The essentia of these efforts 
reflects the TÜSİAD understands on democracy, which equates the term with 
good governance. The organization increasingly insisted on a neutral 
administration and the performance of laws for the establishment of a secure 
and foreseeable context. Security, predictability and responsibility constituted 
the basis for TUSİAD‘s demand for democratization, primarily as an instrument 
for better governance which, in turn, was identified as a precondition for 
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attaining and sustaining competitiveness in the global era (Öniş and Türem, 
2001: 98). 
 
 
In an alternative manner TÜSİAD also demanded democratic reforms in 
order to act parallel to the so called "global norms" of citizenship and human 
rights. TÜSİAD‘s publications in 1997, 1999 and more recent one that is 
published in 2006 touched upon the sensitive issues including the freedom of 
expression, the extension of the language and cultural rights of the Kurds and 
the necessity to establish the civilian control over the military and alike. Hence, 
these reports tackled directly and suggested deep-seated reforms in the two 
key areas constituting the most troublesome and problematic aspects of 
Turkish democracy, namely the issue of "minority rights" and the pervasive 
role of the military in Turkish politics (Öniş and Türem, 2001: 100). 
 
Although with a different nature, focus and track "The Independent 
Association of Businessmen and Industrialists", MÜSİAD, which is a more 
recent organization that was founded in 1990, also expressed the importance 
of democratic opening. In contrast, to TÜSİAD‘s members, MÜSİAD members 
are small and medium sized firms, supported with a limited number of large 
scale firms. The organization's membership size reached to its peak with 
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around 3000 firms, displaying a parallelism with the rise of the Islamist Welfare 
Party in the mid-1990s (Öniş, 1997: 750-755). Like TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD has also 
issued a number of reports related to both economic and non-economic 
spheres including issues of democratization. Different than the TÜSİAD‘s 
studies which prioritize the above-mentioned issues, MÜSİAD‘s reports 
revolve around the critics of the secular character of the Turkish state and 
demand for an additional space of religious rights and freedoms whereas 
TÜSİAD has never challenged the Turkish version of the secular state. It 
would not be wrong to argue that, the organization mostly highlight the 
problems related to the religious freedoms and did not involve in discussions 
related to the individual rights and democratic freedoms. In comparison to 
TUSİAD, MÜSİAD tried to draw an extra attention on the issue of "social and 
ethical rights" within business-labor relations with the aim of a more fair 
distribution of public resources among large and small businessmen. 
 
The most significant attempt of MÜSİAD related to democratization was 
crystallized in the organization‘s report called as the "Constitutional Reform 
and the Democratization of the State". Basically this report contains 
recommendations that would help to reorganize the state in a way that it would 
be more responsible to the society. With this report MÜSİAD altered and 
expended its limited vision about democratization raised issues like 
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accountable governance, parliamentary modification, and abolition of 
boundaries on the freedom of thought and alike. It would not be wrong to 
argue that MÜSİAD during the late 1990s team up with TÜSİAD on the idea of 
"optimal government" based on constitutional limits on the share of fiscal 
deficit as a proportion of GNP, with both visions clearly influenced by the 
language and the rhetoric of neo-libearlism and the New Right (Öniş and 
Türem, 2001: 102). 
 
 
Surely TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD are not the only interest based 
organizations that put efforts in the directions of democratization. The Union of 
Turkish Chambers and Stock Exchanges (TOBB) surfaced as yet another 
organization during the 1990s that involved in democratization debates. 
Indeed TOBB pioneered the debate about democratization with their report 
entitled as "The Eastern Question" in 1995 preceding the other publications 
and reports by organizations mentioned above. The report touched upon the 
economic, political and social problems of eastern Anatolia and offered a 
series of solutions. After their first report, TOBB has published two further 
studies, related to the constitutional arrangements and law on political parties 
and elections. The former was criticizing the undemocratic character of the 
1982 constitution and comprised some mild and circuitous proposals for 
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transformation in the areas of  human rights, individual and civil freedoms are 
mentioned in the text. The latter spotlighted the unfair nature of the laws 
related to the party and election system and offered a series of modifications 
in order to widen the limits of political representation. According to Öniş and 
Türem (2001: 103) TOBB prioritize the issues related to laws and regulations 
because they consider ―existing legal framework as one of the major obstacles 
in the way of achieving a Western style liberal democracy which is 
representative and stable at the same time‖.  
 
 
Although the above-mentioned organizations constitute more or less 
common grounds for pro-democratization efforts "The Turkish Employers' 
Confederation, TİSK, displays an alternative stance compared to others. The 
organization rather than taking part in democratization debates preserved its 
traditional attitude which prioritize the business-labor interactions and wage 
issues. Accordingly, TİSK preferred to interpret globalization in a functional 
way with special focus on issues like flexible specialization and the 
advantages of employing labor on a more flexible basis. The more hot topics 
related to the globalization-democratization nexus in the Turkish context have 
been pushed to the background on the TİSK‘s agenda. 
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Overall, above-mentioned interest based associations started to 
perceive democracy on the basis of values that it rest upon,  and value the 
issues like human rights and citizenship during the 1990s. Although their 
efforts display irregularities they have produced genuine reports on issues 
relating to democratization, civil and human rights and constitutional reform. 
The highest score of 4.09 on DC-CS-R rectangle for interest based 
organizations related to the values dimension also certifies this tendency. 
However this tendency should transform itself into―regularity‖ with the aim of 
extending civil and human rights. 
 
 
There is no doubt that interest based associations, notably TÜSİAD, 
took active position for pushing democratic reforms into Turkish politics and 
their worth should not be undervalued. However we have to still analyze the 
margins of these attempts in order to understand the issue in a comprehensive 
manner. In most of the cases these limits are dependent on the organizations‘ 
relationship with state. Although the interest based business associations 
enjoyed a degree of independence from state during the post-1980 era, it 
would be disingenuous to conclude that the dependency of these 
organizations to the state has been disappeared. The interest based 
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organizations in Turkey maintain uneven admittance to state assets. One 
another conclusion about interest based associations in Turkey may be related 
to their heterogeneous character. This heterogeneity ―among‖ the 
organizations also visible ―within‖ the organizations. According to Öniş and 
Türem (2001:111) the internal divisions or conflicts also restrict the ability of 
key business associations like TÜSİAD or TOBB to play a more active role in 
this respect. 
 
 
In most of the cases, the interest based organizations tend to perceive 
democracy as a tool to an end rather than as something which is essential and 
important in itself. This understanding on democracy became clearly visible 
especially issues related to globalization and European Union (EU). They tend 
to view the full membership to the EU as an objective  with economical 
benefits. Democratization, on the other hand, is perceived as an intermediary 
step that needed to be fulfilled within the process by these organizations. So 
one can conclude that the contribution of such kind of interest based 
organizations to democratic consolidation is heavily dependent on the external 
factors like the membership to the EU. Hence one might conclude that if the 
―signals provided by the EU are weak in this direction as compared with the 
other candidate countries included in the enlargement process, the likelihood 
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of the business community pursuing the wider democratization agenda with 
any kind of vigor will be considerably reduced.‖ (Öniş and Türem, 2001: 110).  
 
Interest based organizations seem to focus more heavily on the 
conducive benefits of democratic consolidation such as the betterment in the 
economical sphere. That is why mostly these organizations do not have any 
concern in setting coalitions with other segments of civil society to confront the 
state and promote its democratization agenda. Mostly the business 
associations in Turkey, have been quite reluctant to enter into such alliances 
and have been careful to maintain a distant, arm's length relationship both with 
other business associations as well as wider segments of the civil society. 
According to Öniş (2001, 111) this "weak horizontal integration" in Turkish civil 
society and ignorance of the different segments of civil society by business 
community creates a major weakness in terms of further expansion of 
democratic norms in Turkey. Moreover the semi official nature of the other 
organizations like TOBB limits the ability of these associations‘ abilities to 
introduce wider democratization agenda. Accordingly it would not be wrong to 
conclude that the business community in Turkey cannot act in a uniform 
manner to promote democratic development.  
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All of these comments and conclusions force us to inquire the nature of 
these efforts in the sense that whether they are efforts 'from below'. Such kind 
of an inquiry will reveal the limits of the contribution of interest based groups to 
the democratic consolidation. In a political setting where civil society is 
naturally fragile and fragmented, I have an inclination to argue that interest 
based organizations have limited contribution to democratic openings. That is 
to say they do not foresee and propose fundamental democratic 
transformations but instead they attach the demands of democratization to 
their primary interests. 
 
Not surprisingly by the end of 1980s the concept of civil society also 
became popular among the occupational organizations in Turkey. Nearly all of 
the occupational organizations not only charged the term with an inherent 
positive substance but also compete for the sole representation of the civil 
society. Basically occupational organizations perceive civil society in two 
diverse approaches. According to Bora (2000: 303) the first occupational 
group which consists of entrepreneurship/capital based organizations 
perceives the civil society as a power node within the society and try to 
encapsulate and legitimize the use this source of power node under their 
authorities by referring representation abilities. On the other hand the second 
group which consists of expertise based organizations gives special 
 146 
 
importance to the qualitative aspects of the term, like democratization, 
freedom and alike. When we analyse the inner-organization structure while we 
observe that the ―figure of president‖ is quite strong among the first group the 
sense of togetherness is much more valued among the second group (Bora, 
2000: 303).  
 
The advanced technological methods employed among occupations, 
increased professionalization and the changed complex market relations 
during the last two decades affected the occupational organizations‘ fabric. For 
example the Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects 
(TMMOB) faced the decentralization demands of the local branches of 
architect and engineer chambers. According to Bora (2000: 304) while these 
local branches insist on a change about TMMOB which transforms the 
organization into a loose confederation, the central administration of TMMOB 
thinks that such kind of a transformation will affect the power of organization in 
a negative manner. Through debates, TMMOB, announced that the 
organization should not be perceived solely as a functional organization that 
provide services to its members. TMMOB argues that the organization is an 
area that carries certain values like democratization, freedom and alike. This 
approach is also visible in Turkish Doctors‘ Union (TTB). Instead of being a 
bureaucratic organization that is in service of state, on many instances and 
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local publications TTB declared that they have the aim of being the doctors‘ 
organization. This was an alternative stance to chamber tradition in Turkey 
where they act as regularity tools for governments. As Bianchi (1984) correctly 
puts the chambers with the above mentioned role aimed to control the 
members rather than representing them. Among the responsibilities of 
chambers we may also include issuing licenses to the exporters (Kalaycıoğlu, 
1991: 83), purchasing of government subsidized products and alike. All of 
these functions of chambers forced them to perform as state economic 
enterprises rather than focusing on interest articulation (Ergüder, 1991: 73). 
The central governments‘ tendency to regulate the private economic activity 
through these chambers may also be counted among the factors that bar 
these organizations ability as civil societal organizations. So in overall I have 
an inclination to say that these interest based organizations carry a historical 
luggage which is stuffed with practices of a form of state corporatism. This 
form of corporatism comparatively is less visible among the organizations like 
TÜSİAD and alike. In principle for a long time these organizations kept their 
distance from the governments (Esmer, 1991: 128). Although these groups 
have their relative autonomy against state they still had little impact on the 
political efficacy. These groups seemed to speak up for the public interest 
rather than their own members‘ interest and did not carry any economic 
activity that clashes with the objectives of governments (Esmer, 1991: 130) 
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 It would not be wrong to argue that today in Turkey interest based civil 
society organizations display significant ties with the Turkish state. These ties 
become quite visible when state tries to manipulate the economic or social 
activities through these organizations. Accordingly the type of relationship 
between interest based civil society organizations and state may easily 
transform itself to a clientelist one. Although this clientelist type of relationship 
was quite dominant through the early years of republic it started to change 
especially by the 1990s. However this change happens in a quite slow and 
careful manner. Although the interest based organizations touched upon the 
issues related to democratization lately, they were watchful to display 
themselves within the status-quo, not as agents that want to change it.  
Alternatively they try to justify and melt their interest within the overall interests 
of Turkish society that were defined by the state. This kind of justification is 
highly related with the republican political culture which rejects the class 
differences among the Turkish society (Vorhoff, 2002: 351). Unless these 
organizations will follow alternative strategies which further relieve their ties 
with status-quo, it would not be easy for them actively contribute to the 
democratic consolidation process in Turkey.  
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4.3.2  Topic Oriented Organizations 
 
As stated earlier this category includes the organizations that work for 
the improvement of quality of community as a whole on special topics 
(environment, human rights, election monitoring etc.). Accordingly under this 
heading I will be analysing the DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A scores produced by the 
topic oriented organizations at the intermediate level with a special focus on 
the human rights organizations in Turkey. The DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A scores of 
topic oriented organizations are provided in figure 9. 
FIGURE 10 DC-CS-R/DC-CS-A SCORES FOR TOPIC ORIENTED  
ORGANIZATIONS 
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Like other topic oriented civil society organizations human rights 
organizations appeared as an important part of civil society in Turkey starting 
with the 1980s. Although there were attempts to raise the issues related to 
human rights in the public and political agenda in Turkey before 1980s, these 
efforts were not successful and often accused of being anti-state and 
communist  (Plagemann, 2002, 362). However starting from 1980s the human 
rights issues became more familiar to the public with the efforts of a number of 
organizations. These initial attempts were spotlighting a limited number of 
issues and basically focused on the conditions of prisoners. This narrow focus, 
when combined with inadequate social support and organizational ability, 
limited the success of these organizations at the social level. Additionally the 
early attempts of these organizations carried a high level of ideological nature 
which contributed to the above mentioned failure. For example on a number of 
occasions TAYAD refused to cooperate with İHD because of ideological 
differences (Şeşen, 1996: 205).   
 
Organizations like Human Rights Organization (İHD) and Association of 
Families of Prisoners and Detainees (TAYAD) while underlining the human 
right violations in prisons, not surprisingly gained the hostility of Turkish state. 
Both of the organizations faced a series of investigations and accusations 
which interrupted and barred their activities. However one important difference 
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between İHD and TAYAD is that, İHD successfully recognized the insufficiency 
of the social base of the organization and tried to enhance their social base in 
order to gain more legitimacy among the public. This strategy when combined 
with improved organizational skills provided a space to İHD against state. 
Moreover the ―activist base‖ of İHD was also developing, as being the only 
legal leftist platform of late 1980s (Plagemann, 2002, 364). With these updated 
credentials, İHD enhanced its vision and started to vocalize other human rights 
issues like citizen rights, women rights and alike. With the relative political 
relaxation of early 1990s the groups which were originally organized under 
İHD started to leave the organization and locate themselves under other 
organizations such as bars, chambers and trade unions. At the same time, 
however, other alternative groups such as feminists, environmentalists and 
alike started to unionize under the organization. Accordingly by the early 
1990s İHD totally alternated its original vision and started to deal with a 
diverse set of human rights issues. 
 
The political climate of 1990s in Turkey was labeled by two salient 
topics: The Kurdish problem and the rising of political Islam. The disapproving 
position which were taken against Turkish state on these issues, created 
serious problems for human rights organizations in Turkey. Additionally, the 
position that was taken related to Kurdish problem which included serious 
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accusations to the state, especially damaged the legitimacy of these 
organizations among the public eye. One critical result of this situation was 
mislaying the popular support. These developments started a new discussion 
among human rights organizations in Turkey that focused on the need for an 
alternative strategy. This new strategy was anticipating an alternative 
approach to human rights issues that does not limit itself with concentrating on 
the policies of state.  Rather it defined the human rights as the ethical standard 
of political and social life (Plagemann, 2002, 371). So by the mid 1990s the 
human rights movement in Turkey, once again, tried to establish a popular 
base by referring alternative human rights issues rather than concentrating on 
limited subjects.  
 
By the mid 1990s other than the human rights organizations, the 
occupational associations also started to involve with human rights issues. 
Arising from the need to refer to legal expertise for setting the standards of 
human rights, the position of lawyers‘ associations and bars became vital. A 
number of organizations including the bars of İstanbul, İzmir and Diyarbakır 
and voluntary associations of lawyers like Contemporary Lawyers‘ Association 
and Conservative Lawyers‘ Association carried a number of campaigns related 
to the human rights violations (Berktay, 1995: 36).  
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On most of the cases the subject matter of the human rights activities is 
the policies of states. Serious critics of human rights organizations may create 
both domestic and international problems for any state. Hence as a reflex 
states has always been suspicious about the activities of human rights 
organizations and Turkey is not an exception. Additionally in the Turkish 
context the human rights issues were commonly perceived within the 
framework of relations with Europe. This condition contributed to the 
understating the issue of human rights as artificial trouble. This perception 
fuelled the dose of suspicion among the eyes of state officials and human 
rights organizations were blamed not only for criticizing the state but also for 
being agents of international actors. Hence reforms that were pushed by 
international actors were always questioned and faced the problem of 
institutionalization.  
 
It seems that, the state of Turkish democracy during the last two 
decades, in most of the cases, is stacked between opportunities and 
disappointments. On the one hand, this state is full of hope, fuelled by the 
democratic developments including the election of pro-Islamic governments, 
establishment of pro-Kurdish parties and alike. The issues that were hardly 
mentioned or tolerated after the 1980 coup -like the question of minorities, 
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criticisms on state-, became a part of the daily political agenda. By the end of 
1990s judiciary in Turkey attached itself to this trend by becoming more 
sensitive to human rights issues. However on the other hand, during these 
Turkey remained a country in which human rights violations were common. 
Additionally the military‘s propensity to supervise the civilian rule, which was 
certified by three military coups, lingered on by, perhaps habitually, forcing the 
elected prime minister to resign. These developments were reported by the 
officers of the European Union in 1999, with special reference to the ―serious 
shortcomings in terms of human rights and protection of minorities‖. Since the 
duty of advancement towards democratization and the improvement of 
fundamental human rights, usually, were not carried by Turkish state, this 
need has been vocalized by a number of associations both within and outside 
Turkey. These efforts were materialized especially in the forms of 
documentations that mentioned the nature and extent of human rights 
violations around the country. Hence, even though the Turkish state acted 
reluctant to develop and implement human rights, still both in theory and 
application the issue of human rights made substantial inroad in Turkey.  
Internationally sanctioned codes of human rights have been adopted as a 
normative standard and a practical tool by a variety of groups that have 
together come to constitute part of a vocal civil society in Turkey (Watts, 2001: 
12).  
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Although traditionally the discussion on the human right issues in 
Turkey refers to the state‘s actions, interestingly variety of civil societal 
organizations took the advantage of the ―human rights discourse‖ and placed 
this discourse at the very center of their agenda. For example Islamist 
movement in Turkey through the civil societal organizations has ―amalgamated 
its notion of rights  to include liberal definitions of individual human rights along 
with more  traditional Islamic conceptions of rights deriving from community 
membership‖ (White, 2001: 17-26). Moreover, organizations dealing with 
women‘s and children rights attached the issue of human rights to their 
discourses (Arat, 2001: 27-34; Libal 2001: 35-44).  Additionally, Turkish state 
executed investigations to analyze human rights violations in Turkey which 
ended up reports that echoed within both national and international circles. 
Furthermore on numerous occasions the need for a new constitution and laws 
that extend the basis for human rights were mentioned by the state itself.  
 
Since the Turkish state seems reluctant and/or inefficient to establish 
human rights norms within the country, this role was taken over by civil society 
organizations. However one critical question still remains: to what extend 
these organizations can be efficient enough to open up space for extending 
human rights in Turkey? One strategy is to cooperate with international human 
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rights organizations. In order to be more effective on governments, globally, 
civil society organizations that deal with human rights issues prefer to carry the 
disputes to the international arena. By multiplying ―the channels of access to 
the international system‖ and making ―international resources available to new 
actors‖ transnational networks have helped activists advocating various forms 
of human rights to obtain money, credibility, and political and economic 
leverage against the state (Keck and Sikkink, 1998:  1-39). Turkish human 
rights organizations seemed to follow the same strategy. According to Cizre 
(2001: 63-67) Turkey‘s two preeminent human rights organizations, the 
Human   Rights Foundation and the Turkish Human Rights Association, are 
aligned with a variety of international  agencies, and are funded almost entirely 
by outside sponsors. Elsewhere Arat (2001: 28-32) underscores the 
importance of Turkish women‘s links to feminists abroad were for the 
promotion of women‘s rights in Turkey; by giving the example   of Turkish 
women‘s centers, which in 1992 received a great deal of publicity and 
extensive legitimization from their prominent participation in an international 
petition campaign to secure the acknowledgment of women‘s rights as human 
rights.  
 
Such kind of efforts, underlie the importance of ―international 
institutionalization‖ (Risse-Kappen, 1995: 6) -a term which describes to the 
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level that a country bounds itself with international or bi-lateral agreements- as 
a factor which influence the effectiveness of human rights-promoting civil 
society organizations in democratic settings. The international agreements can 
be utilized to force the states for taking more action. In the Turkish context this 
trend displayed itself as the ratification of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the country‘s participation in the European Court of Human Rights, 
which rulings against Turkey by the Court have contributed directly to the 
implementation of new laws (Hicks, 2001: 85). Within the same framework, 
Arat (2001) and Libal (2001) correctly underlie the importance of Turkey‘s 
signing of the Convention on the Elimination of All  Types of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW) in 1985 and United Nations Declaration of the 
Rights of the Child in 1990 as important catalysts for the women‘s and 
children‘s rights‘ movement in Turkey. However one has to mention an 
important caveat here. Although it seems that at the global level transnational 
human rights networks contributed to the actions of human rights 
organizations, the Turkish context suggests a more complex scene 
which these networks at the same time hinder the work of domestic 
human rights activists. Both Cizre (2001: 55-77) and Bozarslan (2001: 45-54) 
argue that in Turkey, human rights organizations usually lacked the 
necessary domestic social and political backing, with consequent over-reliance 
on external organizations and  these relationships have further distanced 
 158 
 
 them from the populace they most need to reach, encouraging particular 
standards of discourse and behavior that are unpopular in Turkey. Additionally 
the Turkish state demonstrated a dual approach to these organizations which 
complicated this picture even more. On the one hand the Turkish state has 
tendency of utilizing the human rights organizations as a show-case of formal 
democracy and on the other perceive them as trojan horses, disposing secret 
political agendas.  
 
The problems that I have defined for interest based organizations are 
also valid for the topic oriented organizations. The low scores of DC-CS-R and 
DC-CS-A are highly related with the position of state against these 
organizations. These problems are symptoms of a historic relationship 
between state and society in which the rights of the state to protect itself and 
its own vision of the nation are privileged over the rights of the individual. It 
would not be wrong to suggest that until this relationship is renegotiated by 
integrating basic rights into all levels of life then these problems will probably 
linger on. The practices of human rights organizations that questioned the 
activities of Turkish state which are related to the ethnic, religious and cultural 
matters put serious pressure on these organizations. The huge number of 
lawsuits against these organizations confirms this pressure. Once again the 
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sacred position of Turkish state that does not admit any kind of criticism 
comes into sight and limits the possibilities of democratic openings.  
 
4.3.3  Cultural Organizations 
As mentioned before the organizations that advocate the common 
cultural rights and/or values, religious faiths beliefs and symbols are 
categorized under the heading of cultural civil societal organizations. The DC-
CS-R / DC-CS-A scores of cultural organizations are provided in figure 10. 
FIGURE 11 DC-CS-R/DC-CS-A SCORES FOR CULTURAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 
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When compared to economic interest based organizations cultural 
organizations displayed poorer scores in DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A analysis. The 
formational, impact and value dimensions produced scores around ―3‖ where 
value dimension is close to the neutral value of ―4‖. Similarly the DC-CS-A 
score generated  for cultural organizations is 673.320 which is lower than the 
score of economic interest based groups.  
 
Since Islamic religious communities have an influential role in Turkish 
social and political life, it would be fruitful to make an analysis on their potential 
related to the democratic consolidation in Turkey under this category. An 
investigation on the Fethullah Gülen Community, will be quite helpful for such 
kind of an effort since this community may be counted among the highly 
significant religious communities in Turkey. There has already been a 
discussion about this community‘s contribution to democracy in Turkey 
(Kasaba, 1998; Aras and Çaha, 2000; Başkan: 2005) and by the empirical 
data I got from the database I will try to deepen this discussion.  
 
According to Başkan (2005: 851) Gülen‘s discourse is a double-faced 
one. While Gülen locates Islam as the highest principle for the regulation of 
social structure at the same time he highlights the components of civil societal 
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life such as tolerance and democracy. This double-faced approach produces 
vagueness and leaves limited room for making a consistent analysis about the 
community‘s understanding on civil society with reference to democratic 
consolidation. In order to make a reliable analysis we have to refer to the idea 
of ―Nurculuk‖ which is the basic doctrine of Gülen‘s community. Historically 
Nurculuk displayed a closer position to the state and sanctified the order 
provided by it rather than prioritizing democratization (Başkan, 2005: 851). 
This positioning of Nurcu community ―by the state‖ structurally affected the 
community‘s approach to civil society and civil societal values. As a result of 
this alliance Başkan (2005: 853) argues that the group ended up with 
―hesitation and anxieties, ambiguities, mixed feelings, and political polarization 
among societal actors, unless democratization of state/society relations is 
achieved on the basis of ‗secular‘ organization of civil society and the 
democratic regulations of societal affairs by the Turkish state‖. However if we 
trace the development of community during the last three decades we witness 
an essential change where comparatively the possession of social capital of 
the community has been transformed from an uncivil form to a civil one. So 
our first question still keeps its validity: how can we assess community‘s 
approach to democratic values like tolerance, within the framework of 
democratic consolidation?  
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The community‘s reference to democracy and tolerance became quite 
visible during last two decades. Gülen values tolerance as a tool where we 
can utilize in the absence of societal consensus (Gülen, 1997: 19-20). When 
Gülen defines the components of tolerance he refers to the notions of respect, 
forgiveness, being just and kind. He connects the idea of tolerance with the 
ideas of collective consciousness where societies need to establish in order to 
have a civil life (Gülen, 1997: 19-22). Hence it would not be wrong to argue 
that Nurcu community favoured and encouraged the establishment of the 
value of tolerance among the society. Additionally on democracy, the 
community with the vocalization of Gülen, rejects the inaptness of the notion 
with Islam. He refers to the necessity of order in the Islamic though and argues 
that democracy is helpful to establish this order with the consent of people 
(Can, 1996: 18). For Gülen freedom should not be unlimited since we are 
living in the forms of societies. These societies‘ ethical norms and values may 
be used as a guide for the boundaries for freedoms in order to refrain from 
anarchy (Turgut, 1996).  
 
In related literature it has been argued that the formation of values like 
trust and tolerance is dependent on the formation of the horizontal networks of 
cooperation rather than the vertical ones (Putnam, 1993). It can be argued that 
Gülen‘s community as a cultural civil society organization, displays a vertical 
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structure of cooperation rather than horizontal one. The establishment of 
formal relations along a strong vertical hierarchy, gender discrimination, lack of 
criticism within the community may be counted as some examples for this 
proposition (Başkan, 2005: 857-858). Hence it would not be wrong to argue 
that the functioning of Gülen‘s community does not promise a suitable 
background for the establishment of values for the democratic consolidation. 
Nevertheless Gülen‘s community seems to occupy an important area in the 
civil society discussions in Turkey in relation to the democratic consolidation in 
Turkey.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
The idea of civil society as an actor for democratic consolidation has 
attracted considerable interest in the past decade. Departing from this interest, 
this study sets out to analyze the civil society‘s contribution to democratic 
consolidation. More particularly, the research question guiding this study was: 
What is the condition of civil society as an agent for democratic consolidation 
in Turkey? In this concluding chapter, the empirical and theoretical arguments 
will be summarized and further discussed. The implications of the conceptual 
framework will be scrutinized, and the chapter raises a number of suggestions 
for future research.  
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A substantial amount of all countries that try to consolidate their 
democratic systems end up in a gray zone between democracy and 
authoritarianism (Schedler, 2002). The fact that many transitions result in 
hybrid democracies rather than full-fledged ones, illustrates that the process of 
democratization is much more complex than the transition theories have 
assumed (Carothers, 2002). On such conditions, the actors involve in 
democratic consolidation can make the difference between survival and 
breakdown of a democratic regime (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 14). Surely 
countries try to enhance the possibilities that will further consolidate their 
democracies. Clearly, there are certain conditions that restrict or enhance the 
options available to the actors engaged in democratic consolidation. Who, 
then, are the actors that could act as agents of democratic consolidation? This 
study has focused on one particular actor—civil society. Certainly civil society 
is made up of multitudinous, and sometimes conflicting, interests and 
obviously not every civil society organization has an interest in democratic 
consolidation. Yet, it would not be wrong to argue that at a certain level of 
abstraction we might refer to civil society as an agent for democratic 
consolidation. Other actors, e.g. politicians, elites and alike, can also 
contribute to democratic consolidation and consequently, this study does not 
provide a complete picture of the democratization process. It is rather an 
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attempt that describes the democratic consolidation process from a civil 
society perspective, and the study concludes that the contribution of civil 
society to the democratic consolidation in Turkey is limited, but not totally 
absent.  
 
It would not be wrong to argue that the civil society in Turkey displayed 
signs of development since 1990s. The quantity and also the quality of civil 
society organizations have become different. During this study I have referred 
to the fact that in the Ottoman-Turkish continuum social, political and 
economic power has always been captured by the strong center which 
prevented the establishment of a vivid civil society. At the same time however 
there is still room for being optimistic. The associational life of the republic 
started with the multi party period and accelerated especially with the help of 
1961 constitution and during 1970s many organizations especially the trade 
unions and chambers acted as important agents of political and social 
developments. Although these developments were interrupted by the 1980 
coup, starting from early 1990s again the development of civil society in 
Turkey gained momentum. The publicly known civil societal organizations 
were established during and after the 1990s. It is possible to observe a certain 
amount of decrease in the centre‘s power, especially during the last two 
decades. The last two decades were marked by a number of practices that try 
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to produce alternative stances to strong state. It would be worthwhile to 
remember that all of the civil society organizations that were included to this 
study somehow are the products of this change. Paradoxically this tradition of 
strong state contributed to the establishment of these new organizations: 
Especially events of the 1999 earthquake and issues related to human rights 
fuelled the establishment of new organizations. Hence for a more 
comprehensive evaluation of civil society in Turkey as a contributor to 
democratic consolidation one should consider the complexity of social change 
and mobility among the Turkish society.  
 
Undoubtedly civil society‘s democracy-building functions are complex 
and constitute a mix of supporting and countervailing power functions. These 
functions have been identified and analyzed under four dimensions under this 
study: formational, legal, value and impact. The investigation on the 
formational characteristics of civil society revealed the scope of social 
involvement and activities. A legal setting that accredits citizen participation for 
the realization of common interests is among one of the pre-conditions of a 
civil society that is expected to contribute to the democratic consolidation. The 
legal system should not only provide organized and reasoned codifications 
that comfort the civil society organizations but also refrain from crafting 
mechanisms that curb their freedom or bar their operations. The laws that 
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protect the freedoms of association, assembly of individuals and expression at 
the individual level, should also shield these rights at the organizational level. 
 
The production of democratic merits within and among civil society 
organizations constitutes an important part in our analysis. The participation of 
individuals in civil societal organizations energizes social affinities, amplifies 
commiseration to the other citizens and raises awareness about the deficits of 
democratic system. On the condition that citizens have the chances to 
organize themselves and realize their goals, it is expected that they will be 
committed to the democratic environment that provides the base for these 
activities. 
  
Unequivocally, the civil society organizations do not produce 
democratic values and structures at all times and conditions. It is decisive to 
judge the level of democracy within civil society organizations to avoid this 
tautological reasoning. For a democratic setting every civil societal 
organization should not only have elected leadership based on free and 
uncorrupted elections but also the rules those guarantee the freedom of 
expression within the organization. Even though the above-mentioned 
criterions are set these formal structures may still function in an authoritarian 
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setting.    On the condition that the agenda of organizations is dictated by one 
person or a group there is no space left for the altered ideas of the members 
and the system may produce the condition of the subjugation of the dissenting 
members‘ opinions. Eventually, a structure of such kind will not be contributive 
to the democratization processes. Additionally even if the civil society 
organizations exhibit established democratic practices internally, they may not 
have same outlook against other civil society organizations. Inevitably, if one 
anticipates any kind of democratic input from civil society organizations, the 
ambitions and the means of these organizations should not be in a totalizing 
manner. 
 
Civil society organizations can take an active role during the democratic 
consolidation process by committing solutions to the social and political 
programs. They can awaken the public by pointing out the axial issues and by 
verbalizing the problematic areas and requirements. Civil society organizations 
can effectuate warnings for the elected officials and diagnose the problems 
related to democratic shortages. Hence, by locating these democratic 
paucities and trying to stipulate changes, civil society can play an important 
role during the process of political institutionalization. Furthermore, these 
actions of civil society are not only limited to issues that take part in the 
political sphere. By means of these actions, civil society forces also comment 
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on the issues like projects for the general welfare of the citizens. Where the 
governing elites do not respond to the problems related to democratic deficits, 
sometimes civil society organizations come forth as the main apparatus for 
spotting these problems. Civil society by utilizing the mass medium or by 
noticing the elected officials through different strategies like campaigns and 
alike can lift the issues related to democracy into the political agenda. Hence, 
civil society forces by this way have the opportunity to fill the gap between 
elected officials and society and put up the issues in the public circles that 
political parties and politicians seem reluctant to act upon. 
  
 The civil society forces have the ability to establish collaborative 
interchange with the political society that enhances its impact capability. For 
example, civil society may involve in mutual assignments in which 
organizations pool resources with governmental bodies, or some form of 
partnership. Hence acting as a counterpart, civil society can bring in 
confidence to political society not only by acting as a counseling body but also 
by cooperating with state agencies for a proficient policy performance. 
Additionally, acting out of the scope of state bureaucracy, civil society 
organizations habitually, operate in a more efficient and effective manner 
when compared to state. Therefore, by supplying policy proposals and 
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assistance to the state activity, civil society and government collaboration 
could increase regime performance.  
 
Civil Society in Turkey especially became visible and relatively effective 
by the early 1990s. A general look on the Turkish political history revealed the 
fact that democratic functioning was disrupted by military regimes; all which 
combined political and social reforms with had direct effects on civil society. 
However as a general evaluation I may conclude that although the ruling elite 
allowed some space for civil society, at the same time tried to control and 
manipulate the parts of civil society. Civil society does not stand out as any 
particularly visible democracy-promoting actor in the consolidation process. In 
most cases in the Turkish political history civil society did not emerge as an 
important factor that pressed for the consolidation of democracy. More 
specifically, this study has shown that it was the relative restraint of the 
political regimes, in combination with both inclusive and exclusive strategies 
and attempts to split civil society, which undermined civil society‘s 
countervailing power. Only during the times of relative political relaxation the 
tendency to unionize and hence the production of democratic demands 
becomes visible. When Turkey started to enjoy a more stable political context 
especially during late 1990s, new organizations emerged and civil society 
developed into an important countervailing power that criticized the 
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government on many areas including human rights abuses, the membership to 
European Union and alike. Under these circumstances the role of civil society 
has been changed and civil society started to transform itself into an important 
agenda setter, which has attracted attention to issues related to the 
democratic quality, such as human rights, the judicial system and the electoral 
process.  
 
Civil society organizations possess important competence in several 
areas, something that became evident especially in the reconstruction work 
after the 1999 earthquake. To what extent civil society organizations have 
been interested in, and been allowed to perform, these consolidation functions 
is dependent on the broader political setting. The case of Turkey illustrates 
that when the political context has been unfavorable, civil society has been 
disappeared from the sight, and when it has been relatively more favorable, 
civil society started to produce democratic consolidation functions. However, 
the Turkish political context is a complicated one; through different strategies 
the Turkish state has tried to undermine the countervailing power of civil 
society in general.  
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The democracy-building functions that have been described as 
important in this study are of course dependent on the selection of 
organizations examined. Different kinds of organizations obviously have 
different interests and, consequently, engage in different kinds of activities. 
Thus, it is no surprise that the traditional civil society organizations are more 
likely to function as a counterpart of the government than new groups, which 
are more likely to act as agenda setters. However, one objective of this study 
has been to analyze different kinds of organizations. What can we learn from 
the case of Turkey and how can the knowledge acquired from this study be of 
any general use? The conclusions presented here are valid only for the case 
of Turkey, but let us turn to a more general discussion of the theoretical ideas 
that we have acquired from the case.  
 
Implications for the study of civil society and democratic consolidation 
relationship researchers enthusiastically welcomed the resurrection of the 
concept of civil society in the 1980s. Civil society appeared as a catchword in 
democratization studies, and like many other catchwords it went from being 
welcomed with uncritical enthusiasm to being fiercely criticized. What is 
particularly interesting about the concept of civil society is that it has been 
subject to a wide range of interpretations in political theory and, consequently, 
has several different meanings. The future stability for a newly established 
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democracy was dependent on a vital civil society, it was often argued. 
However, the idea of civil society soon became subject to widespread 
criticism; it was argued that civil society meant all and nothing, that the 
concept had been stretched beyond recognition and that it provided only 
tautological reasoning. As this study shows, civil society can play a role in the 
process of democratic consolidation. However, we definitely need to refine our 
conceptual tools to be able to understand civil society‘s functions. During the 
consolidation period, civil society can contribute to democratic development by 
being a countervailing power and promulgating a democratic orientation of 
reforms. However, it is important to note that only as long as civil society 
organizations have a commitment to democracy will they advocate a 
democratic orientation of the reforms. Yet civil society may still act as a 
countervailing power, regardless of its internal democracy or whether the 
organizations are interested in democracy. Thus, if we want to understand 
how civil society can strengthen democracy by a process of learning by doing, 
it is crucial to consider the degree of democracy within civil society 
organizations if we want to avoid tautological reasoning. How this can be done 
remains a methodological challenge to democratization studies. One 
particularly challenging feature, as this empirical study illustrates, is that many 
organizations are formally democratic but, in practice, these formal structures 
co-exist with authoritarian traditions, e.g. clientelism. Just like in political 
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societies in many newly established democracies, there is a gap between 
formal democratic structures and informal practices. This problem clearly 
needs to be examined, and one challenge is to develop the appropriate 
methodological tools.  
 
This study has also emphasized the importance of the political context. 
The democratic consolidation as a process is highly under the influence of the 
traditions, historical trajectories and cultural orientations. At the last instance 
both the existence of a democratic state and a democratic civil society is 
dependent on the existence of a democratic political culture. The existence of 
the values tolerance, cooperation and alike are inevitable factors for a 
democratic civil society. Civil society does not emerge from or exist in a 
vacuum, but is formed by the broader state-societal relations. The 
manipulation of civil society by state inevitably damages the democratic 
potential of civil society. In the ideal case civil society should be relieved from 
these manipulations in order to realize its democratic consolidation functions 
set in the study. Taking the political context into account is therefore 
necessary for our understanding of civil society‘s input to democratic 
consolidation. The character of the regime affects civil society and its role in 
this process. If a regime is relatively tolerant towards the popular sectors, and 
uses different strategies to control or to co-opt civil society organizations, 
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these civil society organizations may be less inclined to demand democratic 
reforms. Moreover, if the strategies to control civil society have included 
attempts to split civil society it will, in the same vein, be less prone to set their 
differences aside in order to act collectively for a transition to democracy. 
Consequently, these sectors became less radical, and less concerned with 
urging a change. Thus, there was no united front for a political change, and 
the consolidation was mainly guided by the elite. However, at some instances 
like issues related to human rights abuses civil society emerged as a fierce 
critic of the regime. However, it was not the old organizations that reacted 
against the deteriorating human rights situation but new ones that had 
developed as a response to the political situation. This raises two interesting 
questions; is the emergence of new civil society organizations a requisite for 
an altered relationship between the state and civil society? And, is the 
emergence of new organizations necessary to preserve civil society‘s 
countervailing power function? The strategies of the governing elite, 
particularly the strategies that a government might use to control or manipulate 
civil society, are equally as important in the consolidation period. Our case 
involves several examples of how the state has included civil society and 
thereby managed to undermine its potential democracy-strengthening 
function. Through subtle means, civil society is being manipulated, and this 
strategy has been used during both authoritarian and democratic periods in 
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order to avoid opposition. It seems, however, that democratic consolidation 
studies‘ understanding of civil society would be more complete if the relation to 
the society was given more attention.  
 
This study based itself on some tentative theoretical ideas. A study like 
this inevitably stresses recent developments and events and, consequently, 
there is a risk that ―events of the day‖ stand out as more important and having 
a more lasting effect than they turn out to have. Thus, a note of caution is 
needed; the theoretical propositions that this study has generated are only 
tentative ideas. To say it in a different way, this is only a photograph of the 
social reality. Needless to say, we need more than ―photographs‖ of social 
phenomena for more detailed analysis. This framework may be supported by 
some extra research methods like in depth interviews and alike to present the 
problematic in a more comprehensive manner However, the conceptual 
framework outlined in this study proved to be a satisfactory tool to analyze civil 
society‘s position during democratic consolidation process in Turkey. It 
illustrated certain processes, but it also generated new questions. The 
framework is particularly concerned with the difficulties that the civil society 
experiences. There are a considerable number of cases that the framework 
outlined here could apply to. In the midst of a global expansion of countries in 
transition, we need better understanding of the process of democratization, 
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particularly of democratic consolidation in societies and civil society‘s functions 
in this process. This study has generated some new ideas concerning civil 
society‘s democracy-building functions that might be worth exploring. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
DC-CS-A/DC-CS-R QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6       7 
 
1-  Türkiye‘deki vatandaşların önemli bir bölümü herhangi bir sivil toplum 
kuruluşuna üyedir.         
2-  Türkiye‘deki sivil toplum örgütlerinin önemli bir bölümü şemsiye kuruluşlar 
(platformlar, konfederasyonlar vb.) altında da örgütlenmiştir.         
3-  Türkiye‘de sivil toplum örgütlerinin oluşması için yeterli alt yapı (insan gücü, 
vatandaş talebi, hukuki düzenlemeler vb.) bulunmaktadır.         
4-  Türkiye‘deki sivil toplum örgütlerinin önemli bir kısmının yurt dışı bağlantısı 
bulunmaktadır.         
5-  Türkiye‘deki sivil toplum kuruluşlarının önemli bir bölümü kuruluş amaçları 
farklı olsa da kendi arasında işbirliği yapmaktadır.         
6-  Türkiye‘deki sivil toplum kuruluşlarının önemli bir bölümü insan kaynakları 
açısından herhangi bir sorun yaşamamaktadır.         
7-  Türkiye‘deki sivil toplum kuruluşlarının önemli bir bölümü teknolojik ve 
altyapısal sorunlar yaşamamaktadır.         
8-  Türkiye‘deki sivil toplum örgütleri toplumdaki tüm grupları (etnik gruplar, 
kadınlar, işçiler vb.) temsil etmektedir.         
9-  Türkiye‘deki sivil toplum örgütlerinin önemli bir bölümü ülke çapında 
örgütlenmiştir.         
10-  Türkiye‘deki vatandaşların önemli bir bölümü siyasi olmayan gönüllü 
hareketlere (gazetelere mektuplar yazmak, siyasi içerikli olmayan dilekçeler 
imzalamak vb.) katılmaktadır.         
Kesinlikle 
katılmıyorum 
Kesinlikle 
katılıyorum 
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11-  Türkiye‘deki vatandaşların önemli bir bölümü gönüllü olarak sivil toplum 
çalışmalarına katılmaktadır.          
12-  Türkiye‘deki vatandaşların önemli bir bölümü sivil toplum kuruluşlarına 
gönüllü olarak bağış yapmaktadır.         
13-  Türkiye‘deki sivil toplum kuruluşlarının önemli bir bölümü finansal açıdan 
herhangi bir sorun yaşamamaktadır.         
14- Türkiye‘de sivil hak ve özgürlükler (ifade, örgütlenme özgürlüğü vb.) 
pratikte kolaylıkla uygulanabilmektedir.         
15-  Türkiye‘de basın özgürlüğü pratikte geniş ölçüde uygulanmaktadır.         
16- Türkiye‘de sivil toplum örgütleri basit (uzun bürokratik işlemler 
gerektirmeyen), hızlı ve masrafsız bir şekilde kurulabilmektedir.         
17-  Türkiye‘de sivil toplum kuruluşlarına vergi kolaylıkları sağlanmaktadır.         
18- Türkiye‘deki sivil toplum kuruluşları hükümetleri özgürce 
eleştirebilmektedir.         
19-  Türkiye‘deki sivil toplum kuruluşları devletin etkisinden bağımsız olarak 
hareket etmektedirler.         
20- Türkiye‘deki sivil toplum kuruluşları hükümet müdahalelerine maruz 
kalmadan faaliyet göstermektedirler.         
21-  Türkiye‘de devlet, sivil toplum kuruluşları ile iletişim halindedir.         
22- Türkiye‘de devlet, sivil toplum kuruluşları arasında ayrımcılık 
yapmamaktadır; hepsine eşit mesafede durmaktadır.         
23-  Türkiye‘deki sivil toplum örgütlerinin önemli bir bölümü devletten herhangi 
bir yardım almamaktadır.         
24- Türkiye‘de vatandaşların temel siyasi hakları (siyasi süreçlere katılım, 
özgür ve adil seçimler sonucunda seçme ve seçilme hakkı, siyasi parti kurma 
vb.) önünde herhangi bir engel bulunmamaktadır.         
25- Türkiye‘de vatandaşların önemli bir bölümü kanunlara uygun 
davranmaktadır ve hukuk devletine saygılıdır.         
26-  Türkiye‘de sivil hak ve özgürlükler (ifade, örgütlenme özgürlüğü vb.) 
kanunlar tarafından garanti altına alınmıştır.         
27-  Türkiye‘de basın özgürlüğü kanunlarca garanti altına alınmıştır.         
28- Türkiye‘de uluslararası sivil toplum kuruluşlarının faaliyetleri 
engellenmemektedir.         
29-  Türkiye‘deki sivil toplum kuruluşlarının uluslararası kuruluşlarla işbirliği 
yapması önünde herhangi bir engel bulunmamaktadır.         
30-  Türkiye‘deki sivil toplum kuruluşları demokratik ilkelerin toplumsal 
seviyede yerleşmesi ve pekişmesi için çalışmalar yürütmektedir.         
31-  Türkiye‘deki sivil toplum kuruluşları bir yöntem olarak şiddeti yoğun olarak 
kullanmaktadır.         
32-  Türkiye‘deki sivil toplum kuruluşlarının iç işleyişleri demokratiktir.          
33-  Türkiye‘deki sivil toplum kuruluşlarının yöneticileri şeffaf ve adil seçimler 
sonucunda göreve gelmektedir.         
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34-  Türkiye‘deki sivil toplum kuruluşları toplumsal seviyede farklı fikirlerin 
oluşması için uygun hoşgörü ortamını yaratmaktadır.         
35-  Türkiye‘deki sivil toplum kuruluşlarında kadın erkek eşitsizliği 
yaşanmamaktadır.          
36-  Türkiye‘deki sivil toplum kuruluşları iktisadi yoksulluğun azaltılması için 
etkili çalışmalar yürütmektedir.         
37-  Türkiye‘deki sivil toplum kuruluşları için yozlaşma (rüşvet, adam kayırma 
vb) önemli bir sorun alanı değildir.         
38-  Türkiye‘deki sivil toplum kuruluşları şeffaf ve denetlenebilir finansal 
yapılara sahiptir.         
39-  Türkiye‘deki sivil toplum kuruluşlarının önemli bir bölümü hükümetlerin 
daha şeffaf ve denetlenebilir olması için çalışmalar yürütmektedir.         
40-  Türkiye‘deki sivil toplum kuruluşları hükümetlerin bütçelerine ilişkin hukuki 
düzenlemelerinde etkilidirler.           
41-  Türkiye‘deki sivil toplum kuruluşları hükümetlerin performanslarını 
gözlemleme ve hesap sorma konusunda etkilidirler.         
42-  Türkiye‘deki sivil toplum kuruluşları toplumun öncelikli sorunlarına 
eğilmektedir.         
43-  Türkiye‘deki vatandaşların önemli bir bölümü sivil toplum kuruluşlarına 
güvenmektedir.         
44-  Türkiye‘deki sivil toplum kuruluşları toplumsal ihtiyaçların karşılanması için 
hükümete baskı uygulamaktadır.         
45-  Türkiye‘deki sivil toplum kuruluşları toplumsal ihtiyaçların karşılanması için 
doğrudan kendileri çalışmaktadır.         
46-  Türkiye‘deki sivil toplum kuruluşları vatandaşları eğitme ve bilgilendirme 
çalışmalarını etkili bir şekilde yürütmektedir.          
47-  Türkiye‘deki sivil toplum kuruluşları vatandaşların örgütlenme, kaynakları 
harekete geçirme ve ortak çalışma yeteneklerini geliştirmektedir.         
48-  Türkiye‘deki sivil toplum kuruluşları, toplumsal olarak dışlanmış kesimleri 
(sokak çocukları, eşcinseller vb.) topluma tekrar kazandırmak için etkili bir 
şekilde çalışmaktadır.         
49-  Türkiye‘deki sivil toplum kuruluşları, üyelerinin sosyal birikimlerinin 
(hoşgörü, güven vb.) artmasına önemli katkılarda bulunmaktadırlar.         
 
  Lütfen kurumunuzun faaliyet alanını işaretleyiniz: 
 
1- İktisadi (üretim veya ticarete yönelik birlikler veya ağlar) 
2- Kültürel (ortak hakları, değerleri, inançları, inanışları ve sembolleri 
savunan dini, etnik, cemaat tipi örgütlenmeler) 
3- Eğitim ve bilgilendirme hizmeti sağlayan (kamunun yararı için eğitim ve 
bilgilendirme faaliyetleri yürüten) 
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4- Çıkar grubu (İşçiler, emekliler, çalışanlar vb. den oluşan üyelerinin ortak 
çıkarlarını koruyan ve geliştirmeye çalışan örgütlenmeler) 
5- Gelişimsel hizmet sağlayan (bireylerin kişisel kaynaklarını birleştirerek 
toplumun kurumlarını, altyapısını ve yaşam kalitesini yükseltmeye çalışan 
örgütlenmeler) 
6- Konu odaklı (Çevre, kadın hakları, tüketiciyi koruma vb. konulara odaklı 
örgütlenmeler) 
7- Yurttaşlık bilinci ile ilgili (siyasi tarafsızlık ilkesi içinde, politik sistemin 
geliştirlmesi için seçim gözlemciliği, seçmen eğitimi, yolsuzluk karşıtlığı 
gibi faaliyetlerde bulunan örgütlenmeler) 
 
Lütfen Kurumunuzun etkinlik alanını seçiniz:  
 
1- Yerel veya bölgesel 
2- Ulusal kurum / Yerel veya bölgesel temsilcilik 
3-  Ulusal 
 
